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The Battered Child and Other
Assaults Upon the Family:
Part Onet
In recent years the medical profession and social service
personnel have devoted increasing effort to defining the
"battered child" or "maltreatment syndrome." Along
with these and other groups the legal profession, both in
the courts and in the legislatures, must bear substantial
responsibility for meeting and alleviating this ancient,
but only recently publicized social phenomenon. This
article, the first portion of a comprehensive three part
study, deals with the problem of identifying and reporting'
the syndrome. The author analyzes the rationale and the
effectiveness of the current identification device of man-
datory reporting statutes. Forthcoming issues of this Re-
view will contain articles concerning prevention and
remedies in relation to the "battered child" syndrome.
Allan H. McCoid*
Although child beating and similar abuse of children are not
modern innovations,' the problem of child abuse has been receiv-
ing more attention during the past decade than ever before. In
tThe origins of this study lie in a symposium on "The Battered Baby"
presented as part of the annual meeting of the Minnesota Civil Liberties
Union, in Saint Paul, Minnesota, on December 7, 1963. The author acknowl-
edges his indebtedness to the participants in that symposium: Dr. Tague
Chisholm, M.D., Clinical Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Medi-
cal School; Mr. Earl Beatt, Family & Childrens Service, United Fund of
Hennepin County, Inc., Minneapolis, Minnesota; Professor Maynard Pirsig,
University of Minnesota Law School; and Dr. Reynold Jensen, Director, Divi-
sion of Child Psychiatry, University of Minnesota. Hospitals and Medical
School, both for their presentation in that program and for their assistance
in the course of this study. The author owes an even greater debt of gratitude
to his colleague, Professor Robert J. Levy, University of Minnesota Law School,
whose advice in the development of this study and whose provision of ma-
terials used have made much of the research meaningful.
This is the first of three parts of a study dealing with the Battered Child.
Parts two and three will appear in forthcoming issues of this Review.
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. See 1 BLAcKsToNE, Co0AnNTARuIs* 452:
The ancient Roman laws gave the father a power of life and death over
his children; upon this principle, that he who gave had also the power
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article after article since the mid-fifties, the medical profession has
been developing a' description of what is sometimes called the
"battered child syndrome" During this same period there has
been a considerable amount Of publicity given by social and wel-
fare publications to the problems of abused and neglected chil-
dren?
Yet, little or no comment on the problem is found in the litera-
ture of the legal profession as such.' This is not to say that the
members of the legal profession have been totally unaware of the
problem or wholly inactive in its solution, for those who have been
working with juvenile courts and other welfare agencies have been
dealing with the problems of child abuse on a day-to-day basis
and have been contributing to the development of programs de-
signed to alleviate such abuse. Indeed, the fruit of some legal
labor may be found in the laws of more than 20 states which have
in a period of two or three years enacted special statutes dealing
with child abuse. But this work has not been publicized to our
profession as a whole, and the workers, legal and social, have been
of taking away. But the rigour of these laws was softened by subsequent
constitutions; so that we find a father banished by the Emperor
Hadrian for killing his son, though he had committed a very heinous
crime, upon this maxim, that "patria potestas in pietate debet, non in
atrocitate, consistere. . . ." [Parental authority should consist or be
exercised in affection, not in atrocity.]
The power of a parent by our English laws is much more moderate;
but still sufficient to keep the child in order and obedience. He may
lawfully correct his child, being under age, in a reasonable manner; for
this is for the benefit of his education.
For this proposition he cites 1 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 130; cf. Com-
monwealth v. Stoddard, 91 Mass. (9 Allen) 280 (1864); Commonwealth v.
Blake, 1 Brewst. 311 (Phila. Q. Sess. 1867); Johnson v. State, 21 Tenn. (2
Humph.) 283, 36 Am. Dec. 322 (1840). (These cases were prosecutions of
parents for abuse of children under the criminal law.)
2. The Children's Bureau, U.S. Dept of Health, Education and Welfare,
Bibliography on the Battered Child, originally published in August, 1962
and revised in July, 1963 and December, 1964, lists all articles and books
dealing with the problem of the battered child, together with papers pre-
sented at various conferences and lists of research in progress.
8. As of the end of December, 1964, the contributions of lawyers to the
literature in this field have been confined to nonlegal publications in the main:
Gill, The Legal Nature of Neglect, 6 NATIONAL PROBATioN AmD PAnorx A. J.
1 (1960); Gwinn, Lewin & Peterson, Roentgenographic Manifestations of
Unsuspected Trauma in Infancy, 176 AW.A.J. 926 (1961), in 2 TORT AD
MEDIcAL YEARBoox 564 (Averback & Belli ed. 1962); Harper, The Physician,
the Battered Child, and the Law, 31 PE)IATRICS 899 (1963); Schoepfer
Legal Implications in Connection With Physical Abuse of Children, in
CHmREN'S Div., AmEmcAN HuMAN Ass' , PROTECiNG Tim BATTEED CHILD
26 (1963).
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compelled to deal with the problem without the understanding
support of a large portion of the legal profession.
While the medical profession plays a major role in the identifi-
cation of the battered child and will have a primary role in the
alleviation of the consequences of parental abuse and the rehabili-
tation of the abuser, and while welfare and social workers must
play major roles in the resolution of the problem, ultimately the
solution must be legal, in the form of legislation and judicial deci-
sions and the machinery of the state designed for the protection of
the child. The legal apparatus must be designed and operated not
only to protect the individual child but also to prevent unneces-
sary disruption or interference with the vital family relationship
between parent and child. All this must be a matter for concern
on the part of the entire legal profession.
The function of this article, and those which are to follow, is
to bring to the attention of a broader range of the legal profession
the problem of the battered child and the solutions which are cur-
rently available for its resolution. Though the author claims no
expertise in the area of family law, and even less in the fields of
medicine and social work, hopefully the discussion which follows
will provide some new insights and may be part of a beginning of
a broader consideration and resolution of the battered baby
problem.
The study has been undertaken from three differing aspects:
(1) how to identify the battered child or the "battered child syn-
drome";
(9) how to prevent child battery or abuse by parents or others;
and
(3) how to remedy those wrongs already done to the child.
This opening portion seeks to review the development of the
medical-social concept of the "battered child syndrome" as a back-
ground for the study of the legal aspects of the problem, and then
discusses the first of the three aspects: identification and reporting
of battered children.
INTRODUCTION: THE MEDICAL-SOCIAL CONCEPT OF
THE BATTERED CHILD SYNDROME 4
The concept of the "battered child syndrome,",; or perhaps a
more descriptive title "the maltreatment syndrome,"" is a rela-
4. This portion of the article is derived from materials listed in the
Children's Bureau, Bibliography on the Battered Child, note 2 supra, and
a paper prepared by Dr. Tague Chisholm in connection with the symposium-
program referred to in note t supra and a projected symposium that was to
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tively recent phenomenon in medical literature. It has developed
within the past decade through the joint efforts of doctors of
medicine and social service workers connected with hospitals and
other welfare agencies.
The earlier publications in the medical field concentrated pri-
marily upon the description of the physical aspects of the child,
notably the 1946 article by Dr. John Caffey, a distinguished
specialist in the field of pediatric radiology.7 Caffey presented a
series of cases of multiple fractures of the long bones of infants in
various stages of healing, found in conjunction with subdural
hematoma He hypothesized a relationship between the two con-
ditions; but, though he seems to have assumed that the conditions
were traumatic in origin, he did not attempt to define the source
of the trauma. Others followed the same technique of concentra-
tion upon the physical condition of the child rather than the origin
of the trauma.9
During the early part of the fifties, articles appeared which
began to refer to the role of the parents. In 1951, Doctors Bar-
meyer, Alderson and Cox, in reporting their own experience with
cases of multiple injuries to the bones of small children, made
reference to ordinary childhood accidents as potential sources of
be published in the Minnesota Law Review. Inasmuch as the latter project did
not come to fruition, credit should here be given to Dr. Chisholm for his
specific contribution toward the presentation of these materials. The author
has not attempted to duplicate Dr. Chisholm's presentation, but has drawn
upon his thinking in preparing the section on the medical-social concept.
5. The term "battered child syndrome" appears to have been coined in
Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller & Silver, The Battered Child Syn-
drome, 181 A.M.A.J. 17 (1962).
6. The alternative term "maltreatment syndrome" was offered in Fon-
tana, Donovan & Wong, The "Maltreatnent Syndrome" in Children, 26D
NEW ENGLAND J. MEDIcINE 1389 (1963). Though it may be more apt, since
it focuses attention upon the maltreater or abuser rather than the victim, the
term has not been widely adopted and therefore in this study reference is
made to the more widely used "battered child syndrome."
7. Dr. Caffey was Professor of Clinical Pediatrics at the College of Phy-
sicians and Surgeons, Columbia University, and Pediatrician at the Babies'
Hospital, New York City, during a major portion of his career. He is the
author of Pediatric X-Ray Diagnosis, one of the leading treatises in the field.
8. Caffey, Multiple Fractures in the Long Bones of Infants Sufferingj
From Chronic Subdural Hematoma, 56 AmERICAw J. ROENTGENOLOGY 168
(1946).
9. See Lis & Frauenberger, Multiple Fractures Associated With Subdurat
Hematoma in Infancy, 6 PEDATRIcs 890 (1950); Smith, Subdural Hematrnoa
With Multiple Fractures: Case Report, 63 AMERICAN J. ROENTGENOLOGY 342
(1950); Snedecor & Wilson, Some Obstetrical Injuries to the Long Bones, 31-A.
J. BONE & JomNT SuRGERY 378 (1949).
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such injuries.10 Two years later Dr. Silverman, of the Department
of Pediatrics and Radiology of the University of Cincinnati Col-
lege of Medicine and the Children's Hospital in Cincinnati, dis-
cussed the use of X ray in discovery and diagnosis of "unrecog-
nized skeletal trauma" and referred to parental carelessness as a
possible cause of such injury, though without suggesting willful
abuse." Dr. Harry Bakwin, writing in 1956 on the multiple skele-
tal injuries in small children, tended to play down the "guilt" of
parents though recognizing parental conduct as a source of such
injuries. 2
Finally, in an article published in 1955, Doctors Woolley and
Evans of the Children's Hospital and College of Medicine of
Wayne University, Detroit, made reference to parental indiffer-
ence, alcoholism, irresponsibility, and immaturity manifested by
uncontrollable aggressions as a cause of child injury.'3 Dr. Caffey,
writing in 1957, returned to the subject of multiple injury to young
children and now emphasized trauma as a cause, coupling this with
the inadequate histories frequently obtained in such cases and
indicating the possibility of parental misconduct as a source of
injury.14
In the last years of the fifties, the medical profession became
much more aware of the abusive character of the injuries which
they had been seeing. In quick succession and from a variety of
sources the focus of attention was directed to parental abuse. 5
10. Barmeyer, Alderson & Cox, Traumatic Periostitis in Young Children,
38 J. PEDIATRICS 184 (1951).
11. Silverman, The Roentgen Manifestations of Unrecognized Skeletal
Trauma in Infants, 69 A&maxcwc J. Ro ENOLOGY 413 (1953).
12. Bakwin, Multiple Skeletal Lesions in Young Children Due to Trauma,
49 J. PEDITRICS 57 (1956).
13. Woolley & Evans, Significance of Skeletal Lesions in Infants Resem-
bling Those of Traumatic Origin, 158 A.M.A.J. 539 (1955).
14. Caffey, Some Traumatic Lesions in Growing Bones Other Than Frac-
tures and Dislocations: Clinical and Radiological Features, 310 BRITmS J.
RADIOLOGY 225 (1957).
15. Fisher, Skeletal Manifestations of Parent-Induced Trauma in Infants
and Children, 51 So. MEDICAL . 956 (1958) (Dr. Fisher is a radiologist at the
Greenville General Hospital, Greenville, South Carolina); Kempe & Silver,
The Problem of Parental Criminal Neglect and Severe Abuse of Children,
98 J. DISASES OF CEMItRE 528 (1959) (Drs. Kempe and Silver are respective-
ly heads of the Divisions of Pediatrics and Radiology at Children's Hospital,
Denver, and this paper was read to the American Pediatric Society at its
annual meeting, May, 1959); Miller, Fractures Among Children: I. Parental
Assault as Causative Agent, 42 MNN. 1micm 1209 (1959) (Dr. miller is
chairman of the Department of Orthopedics and Traumatology at Chicago
Medical School and a member of the staff of the Cook County Hospital).
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In each of these papers emphasis was placed on the importance of
roentgenological examination of children suffering from multiple
injuries and the importance of careful and adroit history-taking
to confirm suspected parental cause. As Dr. Miller phrased this
last point:
History-taking must not be routine; it must not be perfunctory; it
must not be the duty of the inexperienced; it must be painstaking and
probing. The child in many cases cannot speak for himself; he is either
too young or too frightened to tell what really happened. The immature
adult who speaks for him, no matter how evasively, cannot long elude
a knowing interrogation. The examiner, however, must guard against
having an accusing attitude so as not to lose control over the case be-
fore constructive measures can be accomplished, and particularly so that
in the meantime the child will not become the target of vengeance. 16
He went on to indicate that in Chicago at the Cook County Hos-
pital the records of children suspected to be victims of parental
assault were referred to the social service department of the hos-
pital or to a public assistance agency; the family court was in-
formed by phone with a detailed explanatory letter following;
and the Juvenile Protective Association in most instances assumed
responsibility for evaluation and disposition of the child.
In the early sixties, a series of articles was published which
reported more deliberate surveys and studies of the problem. Miss
Elizabeth Elmer, supervisor of the social service department of
Children's Hospital in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, reported on six
cases of injured infants brought to the hospital within one week in
which there was suspicion that the injuries were due to abusive
treatment.' 7 This suspicion led to a detailed study of each case by
the social service department, but not all cases proved abusive in
character. Miss Elmer noted that little systematic study had been
devoted to abused children and their families and suggested that
this lack arose from a combination of "the repugnance felt by most
of our society for the entire subject of abused children" and the
reluctance or resistance of physicians to accept the diagnostic im-
pressions of radiologists.8 She also noted that it was difficult to
deal with suspected child abusers in an objective manner and
that precipitative accusation frequently heightened the parents'
defensiveness and made the study more difficult. This represents
one of the early contributions by social service workers, and the
technique described parallels markedly the type of investigation
described by Dr. Miller at the Cook County Hospital.
16. Miller, supra note 15, at 1211.
17. Elmer, Abused Young Children Seen in Hospitals, Social Work, Oct.
1960, p. 98.
18. Id. p. 100.
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In mid-1961, Dr. Lester Adelson, pathologist and chief deputy
coroner of Cuyahoga County and Professor of Forensic Pathology
at Western Reserve University School of Medicine, reported on a
study of 46 child homicides in and around Cleveland, Ohio. 9 He
stated: "Frank psychosis in the assailant was the single most
common factor in precipitating the fatal incident." Of the 46 cases
studied, 17 of the assailants were mentally ill, four were borderline
psychotic but adjudged legally sane, and nine were emotionally
unbalanced individuals whose attacks were triggered by frustra-
tion and aggravation2 These findings reflected some of the sug-
gestions of earlier authors as to the emotional instability of the
parents who assaulted children.2'
At about the same time, Doctors Gwinn, Lewin and Peterson
of the Department of Radiology of the Children's Hospital and
the School of Medicine at the University of Southern California
in Los Angeles, published an article in the Journal of the Ameri-
can Medical Association in which they laid particular emphasis
upon the willful trauma which produced "unsuspected or unrecog-
nized trauma in infancy."' They too stated that there was little
appreciation of the problem because of the relative rarity of the
experience of private physicians, the misleading history which was
almost always given, and the "physician-shopping" which the
parents engaged in to avoid detection. They described, as had
others, the use of roentgenology to demonstrate multiple traumatic
changes in various locations and different stages of healing, dem-
onstrating repetitive trauma. One critical paragraph from this
article is:
In dealing with the problem, it is important to be aware of the dan-
ger that exists for the child in a home situation where such trauma has
occurred in the past. Repeated injuries are the rule rather than the ex-
ception. Serious injury and even death are not at all uncommon after
19. Adelson, Slaughter of the Innocents-A Study of Forty-Six Homi-
cides in Which the Victims Were Children, 264 Naw ENGLAND J. M DIcINE
1345 (1961).
20. Id. at 1346.
21. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 15, at 960: out of six cases "two of these
[trauma] were in children accidently injured in stable home environments and
four were in children whose parents were emotionally ill"; Woolley & Evans,
supra note 13, at 542: "The general environmental factors surrounding infants
who suffer osseous discontinuity range from 'unavoidable' episodes in stable
households through what we have termed an unprotective environment, to
a surprisingly large segment characterized by the presence of aggressive, im-
mature, or emotionally ill adults"; id. at 541: "Emotional instability on the
part of one or both parents was the rule rather than an isolated finding when
adequate sources of information could be reached ...."
22. Gwinn, Lewin & Peterson, upra note 3; see Editorial, Unsuspected
Trauma, 176 AMAJ. 942 (1961).
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these infants have been returned to the home environment. In the state
of California the physician is required by law to report all such cases
to the appropriate law-enforcement agency. Social service agencies and
juvenile authorities investigate all such situations, -but the results have
not always been satisfactory. Conflicting reports from different physi-
cians as to the presence or absence of injury may be responsible for
the dismissal of legal action.23
Here, as in the Miller and Elmer articles before, the emphasis is
not only upon diagnosis of the multiply injured child but upon
the treatment or prophylactic procedures which may be followed
to prevent further injury.
Within six months there was another report from Los Angeles,
this time from Miss Helen Boardman, director of social services
at the Children's Hospital in Los Angeles.24 She described a study
undertaken in the hospital in 1959 beginning with review of the
records of 12 suspected cases of child abuse, all involving children
under 31/ years and six under 12 months and all but one of which
had a history of repeated injuries. The one exception had third
degree burns involving the entire body, for which the mother had
been charged with pouring boiling water over the child. All had
been returned to parental custody after the injuries had healed
sufficiently; on review it appeared that three were dead, two had
died of injuries sustained after the parents were placed on proba-
tion, and only one had been removed from the parental home.
The frustration of the hospital staff and the law enforcement
officers at their inability to protect the child appeared to arise
from a variety of factors: the inability of the child to communi-
cate, the unwillingness of the adults to admit any abuse on their
own part or on the part of others in the family, the absence of
reliable witnesses, and the inability of probation officers to protect
the child if returned to the custody of the parents. The study
developed the following conclusions:
1. Medical evidence and doctors' opinions on the inflicted nature of
the injuries must be clearly stated on behalf of the child....
2. An adult who inflicts injuries is not reacting to the specific be-
havior of the child, but to his own feelings.
3. Experiences with the repetitive nature of injuries indicate that
an adult who has once injured a child is likely to repeat. Police
warnings, court action, and probationary status have not been adequate
deterrents. The child must be considered to be in grave danger unless
his environment can be proved to be safe. The adult, too, needs pro-
tection from the consequences of his own explosive behavior.
23. Gwinn, Lewin & Peterson, supra note 3, at 930, in 2 TORT & MEDicAL
YARBOOK at 571.
24. Boardman, A Project To Rescue Children From Inflicted Injuries,
Social Work, Jan. 1962, p. 43.
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4. The community needs to define more dearly the point at which
the right of the infant or young child to be healthy, perhaps even to
live, takes precedence over the rights of parents. 25
Miss Boardman then described a conference of the hospital staff
with the presiding judge of the juvenile court, the chief probation
officer, the district attorney, and other law enforcement officers
of Los Angeles, in which a program was developed to give greater
protection to the child. This program included the development
of new reporting procedures and sharing of reports on injured
children by several hospitals in the community, improved supple-
mental histories, more comprehensive radiological examinations
of suspected cases and more complete explanations of reported
findings to the parents, coupled with telephone calls and follow
up written reports in nonmedical terminology to the law enforce-
ment agencies and the juvenile authorities. The effectiveness of
this procedure was evidenced by the experience in 1960 when of
14 cases of suspected abuse, there were petitions to the juvenile
court for action of a noncriminal nature in nine cases, and seven
of these were placed in an environment offering greater safety,
while two were returned to the mother on condition of termination
of the relationship with men suspected of inflicting the injuries on
the children and under the close supervision of the probationary
authorities. The cooperation of medical, social and legal personnel
appeared to be successful.
In July of 1962, Doctors Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droege-
mueller, and Silver published in the Journal of the American Medi-
cal Association their study, "The Battered Child Syndrome. '"
This represented by far the most comprehensive study up to this
time, and appears to have become the landmark discussion in this
area as well as giving a name to the phenomenon being described.
The article was based on a nationwide study of 71 hospitals' ex-
perience with abused children as well as reports from 77 district
attorneys on charges of child abuse handled by their offices, in
addition to a review of the cases reported in the literature already
described.
25. Id. pp. 4849.
26. Supra note 5; see Editorial, The Battered Baby, 181 A.M.AJ. 42(1962). Doctors Xempe and Silver, who had delivered the paper to the
American Pediatric Society in May, 1959, are described in note 15 supra.
Dr. Silverman is described in text accompanying note 11 uMpra. Dr. Brandt
Steele was an Associate Professor of Psychiatry at the University of
Colorado School of Medicine and on the staff of the Children's Hospital
there, and Dr. William Droegemueller was a resident in obstetrics and
gynecology at the University of Colorado and at the Children's Hospital in
Denver.
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The article began:
The battered-child syndrome is a term used by us to characterize a
clinical condition in young children who have received serious physical
abuse, generally from a parent or foster parent. The condition has also
been described as "unrecognized trauma" by radiologists, orthopedists,
pediatricians and social service workers. It is a significant cause of
childhood disability and death. Unfortunately, it is frequently not
recognized or, if diagnosed, is inadequately handled by the physician
because of hesitation to bring the case to the attention of the proper
authorities.; 7
The article went on to describe the incidence of the phenom-
enon: in a single year, 71 hospitals had reported 302 cases, includ-
ing 33 deaths, and 85 cases of permanent brain injury. A third of
these cases had resulted in legal action, yet the 77 district attor-
neys reported 447 cases of child abuse, involving 45 deaths and 29
instances of permanent brain injury, 46 percent of the total num-
ber resulting in legal action. This suggested that the hospitals
were either not seeing all of the cases which occurred or were
not identifying cases of child abuse which did come to them.
Although the authors found that the clinical manifestations
were somewhat variable, they said,
the syndrome should be considered in any child exhibiting evidence of
possible trauma or neglect (fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma,
multiple soft tissue injuries, poor skin hygiene, or malnutrition) or
where there is a marked discrepancy between the clinical findings and
the historical data as supplied by the parents. In cases where a history
of specific injury is not available, or in any child who dies suddenly,
roentgenograms of the entire skeleton should be obtained in order to
ascertain the presence of characteristic multiple bony lesions in various
stages of healing. 28
Although the information on the parents was not as complete
as that obtained with regard to the injuries to the children, the
authors pointed to extreme situations which were found in the
study: direct murder by frankly psychotic parents on the one
hand, and on the other the absence of any overt harm to the child
but the presence of overly anxious parents. Between these ex-
tremes fell a broad range of cases, some involving parents of low
intelligence, some psychopathic-sociopathic individuals, with in-
stances of alcoholism, sexual promiscuity, unstable marriages, and
minor criminal activity being common. The conclusions of the
authors as to the characteristics of the parents were: "They are
27. 181 A.M.A.J. at 17.
28. Id. at 24. This particular statement is from the summary section,
but reflects fairly accurately the section on "Clinical Manifestations."
[Vol. 50:1
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immature, impulsive, self-centered, hypersensitive, and quick to
react with poorly controlled aggression." And even among the non-
sociopathic, middle and higher socio-economic class "from the
scant data that are available, it would appear that in these cases,
too, there is a defect in character structure which allows aggressive
impulses to be expressed too freely. 29
Psychiatric factors are probably of prime importance in the patho-
genesis of the disorder, but our knowledge of these factors is limited.
Parents who inflict abuse on their children do not necessarily have
psychopathic or sociopathic personalities or come from borderline
socioeconomic groups, although most publicised cases have been in
these categories. In most cases some defect in character structure is
probably present; often parents may be repeating the type of child care
practiced on them in their childhood. 30
The authors then discussed the reluctance of physicians to
believe that parents or others having custody of a child could or
would have attacked the child and the reluctance of the physician
to undertake the necessary interrogation or investigation, "to as-
sume the role of policeman or district attorney and start question-
ing patients as if he were investigating a crime."'1 The use of the
terminology of "policeman," "district attorney" and "crime" on
the one hand and "patients" on the other may suggest that even
these investigators tended to identify with the parents. At any
rate, they suggested a sympathetic attitude or approach, welcom-
ing a full disclosure to help the child (and to atone for the past
wrongs of the parent), and indicating a willingness and interest in
helping the parents as well as the child. They emphasized a non-
hostile interrogation with firm assurances that the diagnosis of
child abuse is based on objective findings such as the roentgeno-
grams and presence of inconsistencies between the physical find-
ings of the physician and the recitation of history by the parents.
"The principal concern of the physician should be to make the
correct diagnosis so that he can institute proper therapy and make
certain that a similar event will not occur again." 32
Finally the authors turned to the protective activities of the
physician to make certain of nonrepetition:
He [the physician] should report possible willful trauma to the police
department or any special children's protective service that operates in
his community. The report that he makes should be restricted to the
objective findings which can be verified and, where possible, should be
29. Id. at 18.
30. Id. at 24.
31. Id. at 19.
32. Id. at 23.
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supported by photographs and roentgenograms.... In many states the
hospital is also required to report any case of possible unexplained in-
jury to the proper authorities.33
They referred to agencies offering "protective services" which
along with the police authorities maintain a close association with
the juvenile courts and might be of assistance in bringing the case
of willful trauma before the court,
which alofie has the legal power to sustain a dependency petition for
temporary or permanent separation of the child from the parents'
custody. In addition to the legal investigation, it is usually helpful to
have an evaluation of the psychological and social factors in the case;
this should be started while the child is still in the hospital. If necessary,
a court order should be obtained so that such investigation may be per-
formed:
In many instances the prompt return of the child to the home is
contraindicated because of the threat that additional trauma offers to
the child's health and life. . . . [T]he bias should be in favor of the
child's safety; everything should be done to prevent repeated trauma,
and the physician should not be satisfied to return the child to an en-
vironment where even a moderate risk of repetition exists.04
It is apparent from this last portion of the article that the
medical profession, or at least these representatives of it, see their
role as a rather far-reaching one. One might point out that (as they
have indicated) it is the juvenile court which has the power and
the physician's satisfaction or dissatisfaction may not be the gov-
erning criterion. However, the concern expressed here may proper-
ly motivate the physicians to identify more clearly the "battered
child syndrome" and to overcome some of their reluctance ex-
presssed earlier in order to obtain the type of information and
proof which will become critical in the court's ultimate decision
not to return the child to the "kind mercy" of his parents.
During 1962, two major conferences on the problems of the
abused child were held. The first was a meeting sponsored by the
Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Health,
Education and Welfare, on January 15, 1962Y5 This was attended
by a large number of the authorities already mentioned in this
paper and by others who were concerned with the problem of
protecting the infants from abuse. Out of this meeting came
a substantial amount of activity. The Kempe, Silverman, Steele,
Droegemueller and Silver study, which had been reported to this
33. Ibid.
34. Id. at 24.
35. Children's Bureau, U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare,
Report of Meeting on Physical Abuse of Infants and Young Children,
January 15, 1962.
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group, was published and commented on favorably by editors of
the Journal of the American Medical Association, who urged
upon all members awareness of the problem and cooperation with
the legal authorities as recommended by the authors 6 Another
result was the publication in Pediatrics of a series of articles or
essays which confirmed the findings of earlier writers and agreed
with their conclusions as to the role of the physician in coopera-
tion with social services and legal authorities 7 Another outgrowth
of this meeting was the drafting by the Children's Bureau of a
proposed reporting statute, which will be discussed at some length
in a later section.28
The second conference was jointly sponsored by the Children's
Division of the American Humane Association, the American
Public Welfare Association and the Child Welfare League of
America, on May 31, 1962. At this conference four papers were
presented which were subsequently published under the title,
Protecting the Battered Child.9 Mr. Edgar J. Merrill of the Law-
rence-Lowell District of the Massachusetts Society for the Pre-
vention of Cruelty to Children, reported on a study by the Massa-
chusetts SPCC of over 100 cases involving 200 children referred
to it during 1960.40 Based on data from 115 families with 180
children, the study led to the following conclusions: (1) While
relatives and law enforcement authorities each had made about
23-94 percent of the referrals and while physicians had seen about
30 percent of the cases involved, only 9 percent of the referrals
36. See Editorial, The Battered Baby, 181 A.M.AJ. 42 (1962).
37. Bain, The Physically Abused Child, S1 PEDIATrIcs 895 (1963), noting
the importance of reporting for purposes of determining the real incidence
of the physical abuse and to set in motion some protective program to
prevent further injuries (Dr. Bain was Deputy Chief of the Children's
Bureau at the time); Harper, supra note 3, approving the requirement of
physician reports and commenting on the proposed draft of legislation
referred to below (the late Fowler Harper was, of course, not only a leading
expert in the law of torts but in the field of family law); MlcHenry, Girdany
& Elmer, Unsuspected Trauma With Multiple Skeletal Injuries During
Infancy and Childhood, 31 PEDIATRICS 903 (1963) (Doctors McHenry and
Girdany are members of the Department of Pediatrics at the University
of Pittsburgh School of Medicine and on the staff of Children's Hospital in
Pittsburgh; Miss Elmer was supervisor of social services at Children's
Hospital).
38. CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WEr-
FrE, THE ABUSED CHIn- PRinCiPLES AND SUGGESTED LANGUAGE FOR
LEGISLATION AND REPORTING OF THE PYsICALLY ABUSED CHILD (1963)
[hereinafter cited as Tn ABUsED CHILD].
89. CnLmnRE's Div., AmERICAN Humk-A AssN, PROTECTING THE BAT-
Trno CHILD (1963) [hereinafter cited as PROTECTING TEr BATTERED CHILD].
40. Id. at 1.
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came from the medical profession; (9) the families involved
tended to be nontransient and self-supporting, but showing no
great integration into the communities in which they had lived
for years and relatively few group associations within the com-
munity, coupled with premarital conception in slightly less than
50 percent of the cases and other causes of marital discord promi-
nent; (3) parents represented about 80 percent of the abusers; (4)
the personality characteristics of the abusive mothers fell into
three well-defined groups: (a) those manifesting hostility and
aggressiveness with continual anger at something or some persons
or the world in general, (b) those manifesting rigidity, compulsive-
ness, and lack of warmth, reasonableness, and pliability in think-
ing and beliefs, coupled with marked child rejection attitudes in
many mothers, and (c) those showing strong feelings of passivity
and dependence coupled with a general depression, with a fourth
group consisting of abusive fathers who generally were either
fully or partially unable to support their families; (5) the children
were of all ages, though half were under seven, and were not un-
usual children in terms of mental deficiency, physical disability
and psychosis, but without exception had seriously impaired rela-
tionships with the abusive parent, with the pattern being that one
child in the family was the focus of all the abuse; (6) the use of
the protective services of the society did not preserve the families
in all cases but did retain intact about 66 percent of the families
and provided other treatment such as placement with relatives
or removal of the child by court order or the removal of a parent
from the family. The implications drawn from the study were
the importance of the caseworker, the need for public education,
and the possible need for some clearly defined lines of responsibility
and communication for the identification, referral, and protection
of the abused child. The other three papers, dealing with the
psychiatric,4 medical,4 and legal implications4 3 of physical abuse
of children were primarily commentaries on the agency study
reported by Mr. Merrill, and added little to the overall picture of
the battered child syndrome as developed in the materials already
cited, though some of the ideas expressed (particularly Dr. Kauf-
41. Kaufman, Psychiatric Implications of Physical Abuse of Children,
in PROTECTING THE BATTERED CHILD 17. (Dr. Irving Kaufman was director
of the Center for Child and Family Study in Boston.)
42. Dodge, Medical Implications of Physical Abuse of Children, in
PROTECTING THE BATTERED CHILD 23. (Dr. Philip Dodge was Assistant Pro-
fessor of Neurology at Harvard Medical School.)
43. Schoepfer, Legal Implications in Connection With Physical Abuse
of Children, in PROTECTING THE BATTERED CnmD 26. (Mr. Schoepfer was
Assistant General Counsel to the Boston Legal Aid Society.)
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man's discussion of the psychiatric aspects of parental abuse) bear
directly on the appropriate measures to be taken in dealing with
the syndrome once identified.
Approximately a year later, Vincent De Francis, Director of
the Children's Division of the American Humane Association,
presented to another meeting a report on a year-long study under-
taken by the Humane Association." The study was based on
newspaper reports of child abuse throughout the country during
calendar year 1962. The incidence was 662 cases in all but two of
the states, involving some 557 families. Only 10 percent of the
children were over age 10 and a preponderance fell below age four.
Of 178 children who died as a result of abuse, over 80 percent were
under age four and 53.98 percent were under age two. The parents
were shown to be responsible for about 72.5 percent of the cases
and 75.85 percent of the fatalities, with fathers being responsible
for more total injuries, but mothers being responsible for a higher
number of the fatalities. The description of the abuse can best be
presented in Mr. De Francis' own words:
TYPES OF ABUSE
The forms or types of abuse inflicted on these children is a negative
testimony to the ingenuity and inventiveness of man. By far the greater
number of injuries resulted from beatings with various kinds of im-
plements and instruments. The hairbrush was a common implement
used to beat children. However, the same purpose was accomplished
with deadlier impact by the use of bare fists, straps, electric cords,
T.V. aerials, ropes, rubber hose, fan belts, sticks, wooden spoons, pool
cues, bottles, broom handles, baseball bats, chair legs, and, in one case,
a sculling oar. Less imaginative, -but equally effective, was plain kicking
with street shoes or with heavy work shoes.
Children had their extremities -hands, arms and feet -- burned
in open flames as from gas burners or cigarette lighters. Others bore
burn wounds inflicted on their bodies with lighted cigarettes, electric
irons or hot pokers. Still others were scalded by hot liquids thrown over
them or from being dipped into containers of hot liquids.
Some children were strangled or suffocated by pillows held over
their mouths or plastic bags thrown over their heads. A number were
drowned in bathtubs and one child was buried alive.
To complete the list -children were stabbed, bitten, shot, subjected
to electric shock, were thrown violently to the floor or against a wall,
were stamped on and one child had pepper forced down his throat.
TYPES OF INJURIES
What kinds of injuries were inflicted on them?
The majority had various shapes, sizes and forms of bruises and
contusions. There was a collection of welts, swollen limbs, split lips,
black eyes and lost teeth. One child lost an eye.
44. DE FRicuis, CHILD ABusE - PREvm-w OF A NATIONIDWE SURVuE
(1963).
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Broken bones were common. Some were simple fractures; others
compound. There were many broken arms, broken legs and fractured
ribs. Many children had more than one fracture. One five month old
child was found to have 30 broken bones in his little body.
The grimmest recital of all is the listing of internal injuries and of
head injuries. The head injuries particularly were a sizeable group. Both
the internal injuries and the head injuries were responsible for a great
many of the fatalities. In this group we find damage to internal organs
such as ruptured livers, ruptured spleens and ruptured lungs. Injuries
to the head were concussions or skull fractures, with brain hemorrhage
and brain damage a frequent diagnosis.
This is indeed a grim, sad, sordid and horror-filled recital of what
happens to children in communities in almost every State of the Union.
It is made all the more so by the fact that this represents a compilation
of specific situations-a cumulative report of the findings in 662 dif-
ferent cases.45
De Francis went on to describe a second "in depth" examina-
tion of the family and environmental characteristics of the cases
reported and of the community attitudes and approaches to the
needs of the children and families. Almost a third of the families
had both parents living in the home and with the addition of a
stepparent the total was 80.79 percent; it appeared that the
battered child was not peculiar to any single economic or social
group but was found in the poorer slum areas and the "country
club districts" and came from both culturally deprived families
and families in higher business and professional groupings. Teen-
age parents were in the minority, with the average of the mothers
being 26 and the average of the fathers a little over 30, and with
about two-thirds of the mothers in the age bracket 20-30 and
about half of the fathers in the age bracket 20-35. However the
emotional maturity of the parents was "probably the greatest
single cause for destructive parental behavior." The sociological
information about the families pointed to the same gamut of
social problems, as are found in the "inadequate family" in most
communities: marital difficulty, drinking problems, some adult
crime and delinquency among older siblings. There was a signifi-
cant group of parents with underlying mental illness. Where the
father was the abuser, the conclusion of those making the study
was that the abuse arose from an immediate emotional explosion
in most instances, particularly where an attempt at discipline got
out of control. With the mothers their actions seemed to be more
influenced by deeper psychological pressures and somewhat more
disturbed, imbalanced and irrational thinking.
The conclusions tentatively reached by De Francis were a need
45. Id. at 5-7.
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for greater community concern, increased use of "protective
services," and greater reliance on these welfare agencies than on
law enforcement officials in dealing with the problem.
One outgrowth of both the May, 1962 conference and the
year-long study was the development by the Children's Division
of the American Humane Association of Guidelines for Legisla-
tion to Protect the Battered Child which were published in 1963.46
Like the earlier mentioned proposal of the Children's Bureau,
emphasis is placed on the reporting of suspected cases by physi-
cians and hospital staff personnel. There was, however, no specific
language proposed and the reports were to be made to a public
or private welfare agency providing "Child Protective Service."
During the past two years there has been a continuing flow of
literature on the subject of the abused child: reports on cases
observed by individual doctors, comments on the suggestions
made by the prior writers, and comments on the growing number
of statutes patterned on the Children's Bureau proposed language
or the Children's Division guidelines.47 In 1964, after a number of
46. [Hereinafter cited as GumrEsmEs.] The precise timing of this pro-
posal and that of the Children's Bureau is not quite clear. Both were "pub-
lished" to the public in pamphlet form during 1963. The Guidelines, however,
carries an internal date of October 1962, and the statement on the proposals
for mandatory reporting of inflicted injuries in children was adopted by an
advisory committee of the Children's Division at a meeting held on October
26, 1962. The Abused Child was issued by the Government Printing Office
in September 1963 according to its monthly catalogue, but is referred to in
the mimeographed Bibliography on the Battered Child, July 1963 (rev.),
which in turn was issued in October 1963 and which does not refer to the
Guidelines though it does refer to the earlier Protecting the Battered Child.
One final piece of evidence is the presentation of proposed language in the
June 1963 issue of Pediatrics, which contained the articles arising out of
the January 1962 conference held by the Children's Bureau. See Bain, supra
note 87; Harper, supra note 3.
47. Without attempting to reproduce the entire listing found in the
Children's Bureau's most recent revision of the Bibliography on the Battered
Child, December 1964, the following articles are of interest. From physicians:
Barta & Smith, Willful Trauma to Young Children: A Challenge to the
Physician, 2 CLuncAL n Pfar.4cs 545 (1963); Braun, Braun & Simonds,
The Mistreated Child, 99 CArL. MEDicnm 98 (1963) (really a combined effort
of a doctor, a lawyer and a social worker, but written from the hospital
personnel point of view); Fairburn & Hunt, Caffey's "Third Syndrome"-
A Critical Evaluation ("The Battered Baby"), 4 MEicnE SciENcE AND THE
LAw 123 (1964); Fontana, Donovan & Wong, supra note 6; Griffiths &
Moynihan, Multiple Epiphysial Injuries in Babies, ("Battered Baby" Syn-
drome), British Medical J., Dec. 21, 1963, p. 1558; tenBensel & Raile, The
Battered Child Syndrome, 46 MmNrn. M DInc= 977 (1963); Woolley, The
Pediatrician and the Young Child Subjected to Repeated Physical Abuse,
62 J. PUETArmcs 628 (1963). From social workers: Delsordo, Protective
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states had passed such statutes, De Francis made a review of the
existing legislation with comments on its deficiencies and merits
from the point of view of the proponents of child protective serv-
ices.4 8
From this review, it appears that by early 1965, there had come
a recognition of a distinctive phenomenon called "the battered
child syndrome" which, though it begins with a pattern of injuries
to the child, is really descriptive of a pattern of conduct on the
part of the parents or others who are to guard the welfare of the
child. The medical description can perhaps best be summarized as
multiple injuries in various stages of healing, primarily to the long
bones and soft tissues and frequently coupled with poor hygiene
and malnutrition, but peculiarly identified by the marked discrep-
ancy between the clinical or physical findings and the historical
data provided by the parents.49 Described in terms of the conduct
of the parents or their characteristics, the studies seem to confirm
that the abuser is likely to be an emotionally immature individual
from almost any walk or stratum of society, a person who prob-
ably suffers from the pressures of marital difficulties or economic
circumstances or other emotional pressures not directly related to
the child himself, so that the child becomes merely a focus for gen-
Casework for Abused Children, Children, Nov.-Dec. 1963, p. 213; Morris &
Gould, Role Reversal: A Concept in Dealing With the Neglected Battered-
Child Syndrome, in TE NEGLECTED BATTERED-CHLD SYNDRO~m: ROLE RE-
VERSAL IN 'PARENTS 29 (1963) (published by the Child Welfare League of
America); Morris, Gould & Matthews, Toward Prevention of Child Abuse,
Children, March-April 1964, p. 55. From the lay press: Flato, Parents Who
Beat Children, Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 6, 1962, p. 32, is probably the
best and most widely read of the discussions, while Coles, Terror Struck
Children, New Republic, May 30, 1964, p. 11, written by a psychiatrist is
perhaps a more erudite discussion.
48. DE FRANCIS, REVIEW OF LEGISrATIoN To PROTECT THE BATTERED
CHm : A STUDY OF LAws ENACTED IN 1963 (1964).
49. See the description quoted in text accompanying note 27 supra; cf.
Fontana, Donovan & Wong, supra note 6, at 1389-90; Gwinn, Lewin &
Peterson, Roentgenographic Manifestations of Unsuspected Trauma in In-
fancy, 176 A.M.A.J. 926, 927 (1961), in 2 TORT & MEDICA, YEFRBOOK 564,
565-66 (Averback & Belli ed. 1962). But see Pfundt, The Problem of the
Battered Child, 35 POSTGRADUATF MEDICINE 426 (1964):
The term "battered child" does not refer to a disease, is hardly
a syndrome, and is at best a poorly defined entity, because that
which constitutes wilful, detrimental injury to a child is subject to
individual interpretation. The term encompasses circumstances vary-
ing from surface scratches to murder and from welts to incineration.
If the term "abused child" is used, it may also be interpreted as in-
cluding such facets as suboptimal nutrition, undue emotional stress
or deprivation, and many others.
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eralized frustration or anger and an outlet for the poorly con-
trolled aggressiveness of the parent.
The development of the concept of the battered child syndrome
has moved from the initial identification of physical phenomenon
to concern with the causative factors outside of the body of the
child to a growing concern by the medical profession and by
social workers with the prophylactic measures which can be taken
to prevent recurrent injury to the child. The voluntary procedures
adopted in such locales as Cook County, Illinois, Los Angeles or
Pittsburgh have pointed the way to a more formalized legal pro-
cedure for dealing with the problem of the battered or abused
child.
I. IDENTIFICATION: MANDATORY REPORTING
STATUTES
A medical definition of the "battered child syndrome" involv-
ing multiple injuries manifesting repeated traumata seems now to
be fairly well established.50 It is less clear that a large proportion
of the actual cases of child abuse are in fact identified by physi-
cians who treat them or that physicians are called upon to deal
with many cases of "minor trauma."5' Even so, medical identifica-
tion is a most likely source of information concerning repeated
child abuse and the legal machinery for dealing with the problem
of child battery must depend heavily upon the medical profession's
cooperation in this regard.
A. Timr REPORTG STATUTES
Although a number of states have had for some time statutory
requirements that physicians report to police authorities cases of
gunshot or knife wounds,52 and in some states the required re-
50. See text accompanying notes 27 & 49 supra.
6i. See, e.g., Bain, supra note 37, at 896; Braun, Braun & Simonds,
supra note 47, at 98; Fontana, Donovan & Wong, supra note 6, at 1392;
Griffiths & Moynihan, supra note 47, at 1558; Gwinn, Lewin & Peterson,
supra note 49, at 926, in 2 ToRT & MEDICAL YEARBOOK at 564; Kempe, Silver-
man, Steele, Droegemueller & Silver, supra note 5, at 19; McHenry, Girdany
& Elmer, .spra note 37, at 903; tenBensel & laile, supra note 47, at 981.
52. See, e.g., CAL,. PEN. CODE § 11160; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 1762
(Supp. 1964); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 17, § 3957 (1964); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 336 (Supp. 1964); MICH. Covw. LAws § 750.411 (1948); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 587:19 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:170-25.7 (Supp. 1963);
N.Y. PEN. LAW § 1902; OrE. REv. STAT. § 146.720(1) (1963); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4330 (Supp. 1964); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 25, § 441 (1964); R.I. GEN.
LAws ANN. § 11-47-48 (Supp. 1964); TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-601 (Supp.
1964); Tx. PEN. CODE ANN. art. 782c (Supp. 1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 4012 (1958).
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porting was extended to injuries or wounds resulting from criminal
conduct 53 or to injuries inflicted by other means of violence,54
within the past two years there have appeared in over 30 states
specific statutes which require physicians and others engaged in
related healing professions and occupations to report cases of
injury or abuse to children.5
A substantial number of these reporting acts appear to have
been motivated by the efforts of the Children's Bureau of the
United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare,
which has proposed a model act as follows:
1. Purpose
The purpose of this Act is to provide for the protection of children who
have had physical injury inflicted upon them and who are further
threatened by the conduct of those responsible for their care and pro-
tection. Physicians who -become aware of such cases should report them
to appropriate police authority thereby causing the protective services
of the State to be brought to bear in an effort to protect the health and
welfare of these children and to prevent further abuses.
2. Reports By Physicians and Institutions
Any physician, including any licensed doctor of medicine, licensed osteo-
pathic physician, intern and resident, having reasonable cause to suspect
that [a] child under the age of [the maximum age of juvenile court]
brought to him or coming before him for examination, care or treatment
has had serious physical injury or injuries inflicted upon him other than
by accidental means by a parent or other person responsible for his
care, shall report or cause reports to be made in accordance with the
provisions of the Act; provided that when the attendance of a physician
with respect to a child is pursuant to the performance of services as a
member of the staff of a hospital or similar institution he shall notify
the person in charge of the institution or his designated delegate who
shall report or cause reports to be made in accordance with the pro-
visions of this Act.
53. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 11160, 11161; IOWA CODE § 147.111
(1962); _iAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12A (Supp. 1964); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 587:19 (1955); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330 (Supp. 1964).
54. See, e.g., Mcn. ComvaP. LAws § 750.411 (1948); TENN. CODE ANN. §
88-601 (Supp. 1964).
55. ARmZ. RE v. STAT. ANN. § 13-842.01 (Supp. 1964); CAL. PEN. CODE
§ 11161.5 (Supp. 1964); COLO. Rurv. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-1 to -7 (1963); FLA.
STAT. § 828.041(9) (1963); IABo CODE ANN. § 16-1641 (Supp. 1963); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2041 ff. (Supp. 1965); Ind. Laws 1965, ch. 268; Iowa Acts 1955,
Senate File 50; Kansas Laws 1965, ch. 386; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.835
(Supp. 1965); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:403 (Supp. 1964); ME. REv. STAT. tit.
91, ch. 1056, added by Maine Laws 1965, ch. 68; MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
11A(b) (Supp. 1964); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 119, § 39A (1965); MicH. STAT.
ANN. § 14.564(1)-(5) (Supp. 1964); Mnur. STAT. ANN. § 626.554 (Supp. 1965),
as added by Minn. Laws 1965, ch. 759, § 2; NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:6-8.1 to
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3. Nature and Content of Report; To Whom Made
An oral report shall be made immediately by telephone or otherwise,
and followed as soon thereafter as possible by a report in writing, to an
appropriate police authority. Such reports shall contain the names and
addresses of the child and his parents or other persons responsible for
his care, if known, the child's age, the nature and extent of the child's
injuries (including any evidence of previous injuries), and any other
information that the physician believes might be helpful in establishing
the cause of the injuries and the identity of the perpetrator.
4. Immunity From Liability
Anyone participating in good faith in the making of a report pursuant
to this Act shall have immunity from any liability, civil or criminal,
that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. Any such participant shall
have the same immumty with respect to participation in any judicial
proceeding resulting from such report.
5. Evidence Not Privileged
Neither the physician-patient privilege nor the husband-wife privilege
shall be a ground for excluding evidence regarding a child's injuries or
the cause thereof, in any judicial proceeding resulting from a report
pursuant to this Act.
6. Penalty for Violation
Anyone knowingly and willfully violating the provisions of this Act
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. s
However, a number of the early reporting statutes appear to
have been independent ventures. The California act, passed in
May, 1963, provides:
In any case, in which a minor is brought to a physician and surgeon
for diagnosis or treatment, or is under his charge or care, and it appears
to the physician and surgeon from observation of the minor that the
minor may have been a victim of a violation of Section 273a, he shall
report such fact by telephone and in writing to the head of the police
department of the city or city and county, if the observation is made
in a city or city and county, or to the sheriff, if the observation is
made in unincorporated territory, or to the nearest child welfare agency
offering child protective services. The report shall state, if known, the
name of the minor, his whereabouts, and the character and extent of
the injuries.
-8.7 (Supp. 1964); N.Y. PEN. LAw § 483-cd (Supp. 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§
14-318.2, 14-318.3, 8-53.01, as added by N.C. Laws 1965, ch. 472; NJ). Laws
1965, ch. 327; Onro REv. CODE ANi. § 2151.421 (Page. Supp. 1964); Oxn.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 845-848 (Supp. 1965), as added by Okla. Sess. Laws 1965,
ch. 43; ORE. IRv. STAT. §§ 146.720(1)-.740 (1968); PA. STAT. ANI. tit. 18, §
4330 (Supp. 1964); RI. GEN. LAws ANN. § 40-13.2 (Supp. 1964); S.D. Sess.
Laws 1964, ch. 90; TENx. CODE ANN. § 38-601 (Supp. 1963); TFx. Civ. STAT.
art. 695c-1, §§ 1-3 (Vern. Supp. 1965), added by Tex. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 117;
Utah Laws 1965, ch. 166; Wash. Laws 1965, ch. 13; Wis. STAT. ANN. §
325.21(f) (Supp. 1965); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 14-28.1-6 (Supp. 1963).
56. See THE ABusED Cmrn 11-13.
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The physician and surgeon shall not be required to report as pro-
vided herein if in his opinion it would not be consistent with the health,
care or treatment of the minor.57
The language of this enactment should be read in the light of an
earlier, and more general, provision enacted in 1953 which re-
quired that any person conducting a hospital or pharmacy to
which shall come or be brought, or any physician who shall
have under his charge or care "... any person suffering from any
wound or other injury inflicted by his own act or by the act of
another by means of a knife, gun, pistol or other deadly weapon,
or in cases where injuries have been inflicted upon any person in
violation of any penal law of this state.. ." to make a report to
the police authorities indicating the name of the injured person,
his whereabouts, and the character and extent of his injuries.' s It
was under this earlier provision that a "test case" was made by a
group of physicians and hospital personnel in Los Angeles"9 which
suggested such mandatory disclosure on the part of all physicians
of all battered child cases and which ultimately led to the more
precise language of the 1963 act.
In March 1963 the Idaho legislature enacted a broad act
dealing with child protective services, which contained the fol-
lowing provision:
Physicians and hospitals within this state shall immediately report to
the department [of public assistance] all cases of physical injury to
children when the injury appears to have been caused as a result of
physical abuse by a parent, guardian or legal custodian of the child.
57. CAL. PEN. CODE § 11161.5. CArL. PFE. CODE § 973a provides:
(1) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to
produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any
child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental
suffering, or having the care or custody of any child, willfully causes
or permits the person or health of such child to be injured, or willfully
causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its per-
son or health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in the
county jail not exceeding 1 year, or in the state prison for not less than
one year nor more than 10 years.
(2) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions other than
those likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or
permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical
pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child,
willfully causes or permits the person or health of such child to be
injured, or willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such
situation that its person or health may be endangered, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
58. CAL. PFE. CoDE. §§ 11160, 11161.
59. See Boardman, sumra note 24.
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Complete immunity from civil liability shall be accorded physicians
and hospital personnel testifying in any proceedings under this chap-
ter. Either parent may testify for or against the other regardless of
consent in cases of physical injury to the child where the injury has
been caused by physical abuse by one or both of the parents.6
0
At the same session the Idaho legislature amended the statutes
creating testimonial privileges to exempt testimony in child abuse
cases from the marital privilege and the physician-patient
privilege.61
At about the same time as the California legislature was act-
ing, Minnesota amended its existing law requiring every physi-
cian, surgeon or person authorized to engage in the practice of
healing, every superintendent or manager of a hospital, every
nurse and every pharmacist to report gunshot or similar wounds
which they were called upon to treat, by adding:
Every person required to report such wounds shall, in the same man-
ner as required for the reporting of gunshot or similar wounds, report
injuries or evidence of injuries appearing to arise from the beating or
similar maltreatment of any minor under age of 16 years, whose in-
juries the person is called upon to treat or bandage. No such report
shall be made the subject matter or -basis for any suit for slander or
libel.62
Since the above was an amendment to the existing statutory pro-
visions dealing with "Investigation, Apprehension: Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension," it must be read in conjunction with the
next succeeding section of the Minnesota Statutes:
The report required ... shall be made forthwith by telephone or in
person, and shall be promptly supplemented by letter, enclosed in a
securely sealed, postpaid envelope, addressed to the sheriff of the
county in which the wound is examined, dressed or otherwise treated;
except that, if the place in which the patient is treated for such injury
or his wound dressed or bandaged be in a city of the first, second or
third class, such report shall be made and transmitted as herein pro-
vided to the chief of police of such city instead of the sheriff. The office
of any such sheriff and of any such chief of police shall keep such re-
port as a confidential communication and shall not disclose the name
of the person making the same, and the party making the report shall
not by reason thereof be subpoenaed, examined or forced to testify in
court as a consequence of having made such a report.63
60. IDAHO COD ANN. § 16-1641 (Supp. 1963).
61. IDAHO CODE ANNrr. §§ 9-203(1), (4) (Supp. 1963).
62. Minn. Sess. Laws 1968, ch. 489, § 1 (amending MIN. STAT. ANN. §
626.52 (Supp. 1964) subsequently repealed by M~inn. Sess. Laws 1965, ch.
759, § 1).
63. Mn-N. STAT. § 626.53 (1961).
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While this article was in progress, a revision of the Minnesota
reporting statute was proposed and enacted.64 This revision,
which appears to be modeled on the Children's Bureau act but
differs from it in some ways, begins by repeal of the 1963 amend-
ment to section 626.52 and goes on in a second section to create
a new reporting statute, section 626.554:
626.554 REPORTING OF AALTREATMENT OF MWORS
Sec. 2. Subdivision 1. DECLARATION OF PURPOsE. The purpose of this
section is to provide for the protection of minor children who have had
physical injury inflicted upon them, by other than accidental means,
where the injury appears to have been caused as a result of physical
abuse or neglect.
Subd. 2. WHO MAKES REPORT AND TO WHoM MADE. Any physician,
surgeon, person authorized to engage in the practice of healing, super-
intendent or manager of a hospital, nurse and pharmacist, whether
such physicians, surgeons, persons engaged in the practice of healing,
superintendent or manager of any hospital, nurse and pharmacist be
licensed or not, shall immediately report all cases of physical injury to
children which come to their attention where the injury appears to
have been caused as a result of physical abuse or neglect. Such cases
shall be reported to the appropriate police authority and the county
welfare agency. The appropriate police authority, upon receiving such
a report, shall immediately notify the county welfare agency.
Subd. S. NATURE AN CONTENT OF REPORT. An oral report shall
be made immediately by telephone or otherwise and followed as soon
thereafter as possible by a report in writing, to the appropriate police
authority and the county welfare agency. Such report shall contain the
names and addresses of the child and his parents or other persons re-
sponsible for his care, if known, the child's age, the nature and extent
of the child's injuries, including any evidence of previous injuries, and
any other information that the physician believes might be helpful in
establishing the cause of the injuries and the identity of the perpetrator.
Subd. 4. REsPoNsImILrrY OF COUNTY WELFARE AGENCY. The county
welfare agency shall investigate complaints of neglect and abuse of
children and offer protective social services in an effort to protect the
health and welfare of these children and to present [sic] further abuses.
Subd. 5. IMMUI FROM LIABILITY. Anyone participating in good
faith in the making of a report pursuant to this section shall have im-
munity from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be
incurred or imposed. Any such participant shall have the same immu-
nity with respect to participation in any judicial proceeding resulting
from such report.
Subd. 6. EviDENcE NOT PRIVILEGED. Neither the physician-patient
privilege nor the husband-wife privilege shall be a ground for excluding
evidence regarding a child's injuries or the cause thereof, in any judicial
proceeding resulting from a report pursuant to this section.
Subd. 7. PENALTY FOR VOILATION. Anyone knowingly and willingly
violating the provisions of this section is guilty of a misdemeanor.0 5
64. Minn. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 759, adding Minn. Stat. Ann. § 626.554.
65. Ibid.
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A comparison with the model act quoted earlier will indicate that
the principal variations here occur in the definition of the report-
able injury, the addition of reporting to the welfare agency, and a
section referring to the obligation of that agency to make an
investigation and provide services for the protection of the child,
though the latter is adverted to in the purpose section of the
model act.
Other variations appear in the statutes of other states. But in
spite of variations in the language used to describe the manner in
which the physician comes into contact with the abused child, the
nature of the injuries which he discovers, or the possible source of
such injuries, and variations in the mode and content of the re-
port, the basic thrust of all these statutes is that physicians and
hospitals are required to report cases of apparent child abuse
66. All of the statutes would cover physicians and surgeons, though the
Utah statute noted below, Utah Laws 1965, ch. 166, uses broader terms. The
overwhelming number of the statutes refer also to the specific obligation of
hospitals and similar institutions, the California, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Texas and Wisconsin statutes being exceptional in referring only to physicians
and the North Carolina and North Dakota statutes not specifying an obli-
gation of the hospital as an institution to make a report as distinct from
the obligation of its professional staff personnel.
In some states a number of individual "reporters" have been specified
in addition to physicians and surgeons (usually including interns and residents
in training) and hospitals: osteopathic physicians in Colorado, Florida, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Wash-
ington and Wyoming; nurses in Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, North
Carolina, North Dakota (public health nurses), Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee
and Wyoming; dentists in Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, New York, Oklahoma, South
Dakota and Washington; chiropractors in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Maine, North Dakota and Washington; pharmacists in Indiana, Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Wyoming; chiropodists or podiatrists in Illinois,
Iowa and Washington; laboratory technicians in Indiana and Wyoming; Chris-
tian Science practitioners in Illinois; optometrists in Iowa; embalmers or under-
takers in Tennessee; social or case workers in Kansas; employees of the county
department of welfare in North Carolina; peace officers in Oregon and South
Dakota; school teachers, principals and administrators in public schools in
North Carolina. Minnesota also encompasses "all persons authorized to engage
in the practice of healing," Mmim. STAT. ANw. § 626.554, subd. 2 (Supp. 1965),
which may include in addition to the specified physicians, surgeons, nurses,
superintendents and managers of hospitals and pharmacists, the categories of
osteopathic physicians and surgeons, dentists, Christian Science practitioners,
chiropractors, chiropodists, midwives, masseurs, optometrists, barbers and
cosmeticians. Oregon's statute is similarly broadly phrased to cover "any
practitioner of any healing are licensed in this state." OFn. Ruv. STAT. §
146.720(l).
Wyoming, which appears to have actually enacted the first of the report-
ing statutes referring specifically to child abuse, in February, 1963, includes
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coming to their attention 7 Throughout the remainder of this
article the primary references will be to the model act proposed
by the Children's Bureau and to the Minnesota act, as set forth
above, with references to other state statutes where their provi-
sions are specifically relevant to the discussion.
B. THE RATIONALE OF THE REPORTING STATuTES
Why were such statutes deemed necessary or advisable? The
answer appears to lie in (1) the belief that the physician and
hospitals provided a most ready source of information leading to
"any other person having cause to believe that a child . . . brought before him
or coming before him for examination, care or treatment," Wyo. STAT. A-N.
§ 14-28.1 (1963). Other states have used somewhat similar broad language,
"other persons furnishing medical aid and assistance," Ind. Laws 1965, ch. 268,
§ 1, and "other person called upon to render aid or medical assistance to an
infant," T.NN. CODE ANN. § 38-601 (1964). Kentucky refers to "other persons
having reasonable cause to suspect that a child... brought to his attention,"
Ky. REv. STAT. § 199.835(2) (Supp. 1964). All of these suggest a class of re-
quired reporters somewhat less limited than the general population.
Iowa, however, specified that "any other person who believes a child has
had physical injury inflicted upon him as a result of abuse or neglect may
make a report..." though under no specific obligation, Iowa Legis. Serv. 1965,
Senate File 50, § 3.
Utah, which has the broadest statute of all refers simply to "Any person
having cause to believe that a minor has had physical injury as a result of
unusual or unreasonable physical abuse or neglect, shall report or cause reports
to be made in accordance with the provisions of this act." Utah Laws 1965,
ch. 166, § 2.
67. Although most of the statutory provisions speak in mandatory terms
in describing the obligation of the physician and others to report cases of child
abuse, only a slight majority impose specific sanctions for failure to make a
report: The model act and the statutes of Florida, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming de-
clare that "knowingly and wilfully violating the provisions of this act" is a
misdemeanor, while Oregon and Pennsylvania make wilful failure to report a
misdemeanor and Arizona, California, Michigan, Ohio and Tennessee make
any violation of the reporting act a misdemeanor; Oklahoma declares it "un-
lawful" to knowingly and wilfully fail to make the proper report. California,
however, qualifies its obligation by allowing the physician to refrain from
reporting if in his opinion it would not be consistent with the health, care
and treatment of the minor, see note 57 supra. Those states which lack any
reference to penalty or sanction, though speaking in mandatory terms are
Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York,
North Dakota, Rhode Island and Wisconsin. The statutes of North Carolina,
Texas and Washington are phrased in terms of "may report" and impose no
sanction for non-reporting, apparently leaving it to the professional discretion
of the physician or other persons specified who observe the signs of abuse
whether the report is to be made.
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identification of abused children and (2) the apparent failure of
physicians and hospitals to make disclosures of information con-
cerning possible child abuse to the legal authorities.
1. Reporting by Physicians as a Class
There has been some question as to why physicians and sur-
geons as a class should be singled out as mandatory "informers. '6 8
Such a question is based on two differing points of view. First,
others than physicians are also in a position to learn of child
abuse, including law enforcement officers, social workers, school
teachers, counsellors, and lawyers engaged in dealing with family
problems, yet the statutes have been directed largely at requiring
reporting only by members of the medical profession or related
personnelU 9 Second, the long-established ethical principle of con-
fidentiality may preclude the physician from making disclosures
of information acquired in the course of his professional care and
treatment. Without purporting to reflect the actual thinking of
the various legislatures, the following may be an appropriate
rationale for the "class legislation" here involved.
(a) Physicians and Hospitals as a Class Are Specially
Equipped To Detect Instances of Child Abuse
As a substantial amount of the medical literature has pointed
out, child abuse is likely to occur in the privacy of the home and
the results of such abuse are likely to be explained away by the
parents or guardians as having been caused by "accidents" of
childhood. The fact of injury is more likely to be brought to the
attention of the doctor than to others outside the immediate
68. The question is raised by an Editorial in 188 AM.A.J. 386 (1964),
prepared by the office of the general counsel in which the following state-
ments and questions appear:
The medical profession believes something must be done to pro-
tect the children. But is compulsory reporting the answer? Is reporting
by only one group the answer? Does the battered child always come
to the physician's attention? Is a mandatory report on highly technical
grounds effective? . . . What is done when evidence accumulates at
school, indicating a threat to a child's safety?
This is a social problem in which the physician plays but a part.
Visiting nurses, social workers, school teachers and authorities, lawyers,
marriage and guidance counselors, and others frequently learn of cases
before medical care is demanded or received. To wait until the child
requires medical attention is too late. To compel reporting by the
physician alone may single him out unwisely. Knowing of this re-
quirement, the parent or guardian may, for his own protection, put
off seeking medical care.
69. See note 66 supra.
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family. The physician more than any other individual is able
to determine whether the child's injuries are consistent with the
parent's recital of a history of nontraumatic events or of minor
"accidental" injury. It is the physician who is best able to dis-
cover'the evidence of multiple injuries in various stages of heal-
ing which have come to be recognized as "signs" of the battered
child syndrome. Indeed, the very fact that the medical profession
has seen fit to describe the problem as the battered child syn-
drome, or the "maltreatment syndrome," and to emphasize the
role of the medical practitioner in its detection may explain why
legislators have looked to the medical profession as the class most
likely to make disclosures of child abuse.
Others than physicians may in fact make observations which
might lead to discovery of child abuse or may become aware
of child abuse in the course of professional activities or everyday
contact with the child or its guardian. But the class of potential
observers may be almost unlimited, including not only law en-
forcement officers, school personnel, and those engaged in family
counselling, but also neighbors, other members of the family, or
those who have merely casual contact with the child and family.
It is desirable to focus the responsibility for reporting on a class
of persons having special competence for observation and evalua-
tion of child injury. Provision for mandatory reporting by this
special group does not and should not preclude voluntary re-
porting on the part of others having information concerning
potential child abuse."
(b) Others Who May Observe Child Abuse or Learn the Fact
of Abuse May Have Strong Independent Motivations
for Disclosure
Law enforcement officers, school teachers and administrators,
school and visiting nurses, social workers in state or local agencies
70. This point is clearly brought out in the explanation accompanying
the Children's Bureau's proposal for model legislation:
Parents have the primary responsibility for meeting the needs of their
children. Society has an obligation to help parents discharge this re-
sponsibility. Society must assume this responsibility when parents are
unable to do so.
Children who have suffered physical abuse at the hands of parents
or other persons responsible for their care and protection are most
frequently brought or come to the attention of physicians, either in pri-
vate practice or at hospitals, for care and treatment. Physicians, because
of the nature of the injuries and the case histories of these children,
are in an optimum position to form reasonable, preliminary judgments
as to how the injuries occurred. Although the proposed legislation is
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and similar sources of information within the governmental struc-
ture itself are already under an obligation arising from their
official positions to make disclosures or to invoke the machinery
of government to remedy and deal with the problem of child
abuse. There may be less necessity to impose a specific obligation
of disclosure upon such individuals. To the extent that social
workers and others engaged in activities in nongovernmental wel-
fare or social agencies are involved in dealing with family prob-
lems, they may be motivated by their desire to remedy the entire
family problem in making disclosures or invoking governmental
machinery. Moreover, such social agencies may themselves pro-
vide much of the remedial and preventative functions which the
government machinery would provide if invoked. The traditions
of professional confidentiality, though not absent, may be far less
strong than in the medical profession. Also the psychological
reluctance of doctors to acknowledge that the parents present a
hazard to their children, a fact noted by many of the medical
authorities, may be less likely to be present among those who are
daily concerned with intra-family frictions.
(c) The Impact of "Confidentiality"
Lawyers, members of the clergy, social workers and other
counsellors dealing primarily with the adult members of the
family may be less inclined to volunteer information concerning
child abuse. Their omission from the statutes may be explained
by the fact that they are less likely than the physicians to have
close contact with the child and are far less likely to become in-
volved with or be competent to resolve questions of the nature
of injuries or the source of such injuries. But, in addition, their
omission from the requirement of mandatory reporting may re-
flect their confidential relationship to the adult members of the
family.
It has long been recognized that the attorney's fiduciary rela-
tion to his client forecloses or should foreclose disclosure of infor-
mation acquired in the course of that relationship.71 The ethical,
not intended to prevent or discharge voluntary reporting by others,
because of the seriousness of the situation for children and for society,
it makes reporting mandatory on physicians or institutions where
physicians' services are provided, as is the case with gunshot wounds.
Tim ABUSED CHIL 5-6.
71. The obligation of confidentiality is reflected in the "attorney-client
privilege" against testimonial disclosure, see MmN. STAT. § 595.02(2) (1961);
8 WiGroRE, EviDENcE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMoRE]. This testimonial privilege is limited to communications
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if not the legal, obligation of confidentiality has also been recog-
nized on the part of members of the clergy and social workers and
is urged for all counsellors by some. 2
Where the lawyer or counsellor is dealing with the adult abuser
and as a result of that relationship learns the fact or facts which
indicate past abuse of a child, he may be prevented by his pro-
made by the client or by the lawyer to the client and does not cover other
forms of information which the lawyer may acquire in the course of his
professional activity. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947); 8
WIGmoRE § 2317(2). Moreover, the communication must have been "made
in confidence" and the mere relation of attorney and client does not render
all forms of communication privileged unless the circumstances indicate that
the communication was of a sort intended to be confidential. McCointicK,
EvIDENcE § 95 (1954) [hereinafter cited as McCoRIacK]; 8 WIGMoRE § 2311.
Finally, though descriptions of past criminal conduct fall squarely within
the privilege, it seems well established by judicial decision, if not by
statutory language, that the privilege does not cover communications in
furtherance of a future intended crime or fraud. McCoPrticn § 99; 8 WIG-
MORE § 2298.
The scope of the ethical principle of confidentiality may be broader than
the protection afforded by the testimonial privilege. As phrased by the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics, canon 6 refers to "the obligation to represent
the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or con-
fidences" while canon 37 states,
It is the duty of a lawyer to preserve his client's confidences. This
duty outlasts the lawyer's employment, and extends as well to his
employees .... The announced intent of a client to commit a crime
is not included within the confidences which he [the lawyer] is bound
to respect. He may properly make such disclosures as may be neces-
sary to prevent the act or protect those against whom it is threatened.
In CROMWELL FOUNDATION, OPnmoNs OF THE COMMITTEES ON PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. AND THE
N.Y. CoUNTY LAwYERS' ASS'N, Opinion 316, it appears that the lawyer is
ethically precluded from disclosing information which would not be "privi-
leged" by law because of the presence of third parties. PMrSIG, CASES ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 14 (1965), concludes that the ethical principle
is in fact broader than the evidentiary privilege. Even though there may
be no statutory or common law privilege covering information acquired
from other than the client, one may question whether the attorney should
make public disclosure of facts adverse to his client's interests, so long as
the information was acquired in the course of his professional services for
the client. If disclosure, without reservation, of all facts relevant to the
client's interests is the desideratum of the attorney-client privilege and lies
at the base of the ethical principles of the profession, this same concern for
unreserved disclosure should be applicable to sources of information other
than the client.
72. See McCoRmicK § 8; 8 WIGMORE §§ 2286, 2294-96; Louisell, The
Psychologist in Today's Legal World (pt. 2), 41 imi. L. REv. 731 (1957);
Note, Functional Overlap Between the Lawyer and Other Professionals:
Its Implications for the Privileged Communications Doctrine, 71 YALE LJ.
1226 (1962).
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fessional obligation from making disclosure to legal authorities
adverse to the interests or desires of his client. Where the client
is not the abuser but another member of the family, the immedi-
ate disadvantage to the client may be less obvious, but the pro-
fessional confidence may be nonetheless significant. Where the
client's interest is advanced by disclosure and the imposition of
legal authority between the abuser and the child, or the imposi-
tion of some sanctions against the abuser, the disclosure may be
compelled by the professional obligation of the attorney or other
counsellor to serve the client's interests. But even here the desire
or dictate of the client as to the maintenance of confidentiality
may prevail.
A difficult question would arise where the information con-
cerning past abuse led to an inference of continuing abuse and
therefore the possibility of preventing further criminal conduct.
An exception to the obligation of professional confidentiality has
been recognized as to future criminal conduct on the basis that
the attorney should not by virtue of consultation become an
accessory or participant in such criminal conduct. It may be less
clear that the obligation of confidentiality does not exist where
the attorney or any other counsellor is not being consulted in re-
lation to the possibility of future abuse and when he is not being
asked to assist in concealment of the abuse of the child.73
73. In ABA CozAn. oN PRorassioxAL ETHICS mn G=IvANcES, OPINIONS
(1947), compare opinion 23 (January 24, 1930) "wit& opinions 155-56 (May
4, 1936). In the former, a client had fled before trial and gone into hiding,
his bond was forfeited and the court had issued a warrant for his arrest; the
relatives requested the attorney to endeavor to locate the client and gave
the attorney confidential information as to places where he might be found;
and the attorney eventually located the client and advised him to return
and surrender, which the client did. The committee held that there was no
ethical obligation to disclose the information concerning the client's where-
abouts and that the confidence was one of those which the attorney was
bound to respect, saying:
It is in the public interest that even the worst criminal should-
have counsel, and counsel cannot properly perform their duties without
knowing the truth. To hold that an attorney should reveal confidential
information which he has obtained, by virtue of his professional em-
ployment, from members of the family of a criminal, would prevent
such frank disclosure as might be necessary to a proper protection of
the client's interest.
In the latter cases, the committee ruled that where a defendant in a
criminal case fled the jurisdiction after indictment and later communicated
with his attorney and where a convicted criminal, released on probation,
violated the terms of the probation by leaving the jurisdiction and then
communicated with his attorney in relation to civil matters, the communi-
cations were not privileged and it was the ethical obligation of the attorney
1965]
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The physician also is bound by an ethical principle of confi-
dentiality to refrain from disclosure of medical confidences or
secrets, which has been expressed by the American Medical Asso-
ciation:
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the
course of medical attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe in
the character of patients, unless he is required to do so by law or
to make disclosure of the clients' whereabouts. The committee here said:
It is the duty of an attorney to maintain the confidence and pre-
serve inviolate the secrets of his client, and it is the general rule that
when a client gives his address to his attorney while consulting him
in a professional capacity on a business matter for the purpose of
enabling the attorney to communicate with him in respect thereto, it
is a privileged communication. However, there are some circumstances
under which such a communication is not privileged for reasons
founded on sound public policy. In such cases the attorney may not
remain silent.
When the communication by the client to his attorney is in respect
to the future commission of an unlawful act or to a continuing wrong,
the communication is not privileged. One who is actually engaged in
committing a wrong can have no privileged witnesses and public policy
forbids that an attorney should assist the commission thereof, or per-
mit the relation of attorney and client to conceal the wrongdoing....
In failing to disclose his client's whereabouts as a fugitive under these
circumstances the attorney would not only be aiding his client to
escape trial on the charge for which he was indicted, but would like-
wise be aiding him in evading prosecution for the additional offense
of escape....
A similar question was considered by the committee in Opinion 23.
What was said in that Opinion, as applied to the facts then before the
committee, is not in conflict with the views here stated.
Opinion 155, of ABA CoAnvy. oN PRoruEssroNAL ETHICS AN GRmVANCES,
OPINIONS (1947). And see Opinion 274 (October 25, 1946) where an attorney
learned from his client, a woman seeking a divorce, that her husband had
in fact deserted her some six years earlier but had made false statements to
the draft board that he was living with her in order to escape the draft.
The committee ruled that the communication was in confidence and relevant
to the matter in which the attorney was employed to represent the client:
For the attorney to divulge any of the information about her hus-
band's conduct, communicated to the attorney by the client would
be a breach of that most important duty owed by the attorney to the
client, to keep inviolate the confidence of his client. Further, for a
lawyer to undertake to divulge the information about her husband,
given in confidence by the client, undoubtedly also would disclose that
the client had been covering up her husband and thereby helping him
to evade military service.
From these opinions, one may draw the conclusion that where the attor-
ney is not being asked to affirmatively assist in the continuing criminal con-
duct and is not being consulted in relation to the future conduct of the
miscreant, he may have a professional obligation to maintain confidences.
1965] BATTERED CHILD
or unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare of the
individual or of the community.74
As with the lawyer, the ethical principle is undoubtedly broader
than the technical evidentiary privilege against compulsory dis-
closure on the witness stand, recognized by some two-thirds of the
American jurisdictions.7 r The rationale of both the privilege and
the ethical principle is to
encourage the utmost confidence between the patient and his physician
and to preserve it inviolate, so that the patient will freely and frankly
reveal to his physician all of the facts, circumstances, and symptoms
of his malady or injury, or lay bare his body for examination and thus
enable his physician to make a correct diagnosis of his condition and
treat him more safely and efficaciously.1
74. A.M.A., PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (1957); FLETCHER,
MORALS AND MEDICINE 55-60 (1954); HADFIELD, LAW AND ETHICS FOR Doc-
TORS 55-59 (1958); MARsHALL, THE ETHICS OF MEDICAL PRACTICE 37-39
(1960); Clegg, Professional Ethics, in MEDICAL ETHICS, A GUIDE TO STUDENTS
AND PRACTITmONERS 31, 43-44 (Davidson ed. 1957); Cohen, The Doctor-
Patient Relationship, in MEDICAL ETHICS, A GUIDE TO STUDENTS AND PRAC-
TITIONERS 47, 51 (Davidson ed. 1957).
75. See generally DE WITT, PRIvLEGED COlVImUNICATIONS BETWEEN
PHYsIc A AND PATiENT passin (1958); McComncK §§ 101-08; 8 WIGMORE
§§ 2380-91. Those states which retain the common law rule are Alabama,
Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont and West Virginia (except in justice of peace court).
Where it is accepted, the privilege precludes the physician (and in some
cases nurses or other practitioners of the healing arts) from disclosing on
the witness stand information obtained in attending a patient, which is neces-
sary to enable him to act in a professional capacity. See, e.g., CAL. Cry. PRoc.
CODE § 1881(4); MINN. STAT. § 595.02(4) (1961); N.Y.C..L/.R. 4504(a).
See Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn. 1965), in which, though
the question is not directly presented, the court's opinion does recognize that
the professional obligation is broader than a statutory testimonial privilege.
76. DE WITT, op. cit. supra note 75, at 27; see CAL. Cxv. PROC. CODE §
1881; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 154-1-7 (1963); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
93-701-4 (1964); ORE. REV. STAT. § 44.040 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
24-8 (1953): "There are particular relations in which it is the policy of the
law to encourage confidence and preserve it inviolate ......
HADFIELD, op. cit. supra note 74, at 55-56, states as follows:
The general interest and common welfare require that the patient
shall be able to rely with full confidence upon the secrecy of all
communications made to a doctor. Frank speech is frequently essential
to the proper practice of medicine and should be assured of a con-
fidential reception .... The essence of professional secrecy is that the
patient should be able to tell the practitioner everything that is
necessary for his medical assessment and treatment. This means that
the doctor must hear many things that otherwise would remain in the
knowledge of the patient alone. The patient must be entirely confident
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Yet within the medical profession itself there appears to have
been recognition of limits upon this obligation of confidentiality,
where disclosure is necessary to protect others from either the
hazards of disease or threats to their well-being.77 Similarly, the
profession has ackmowledged its ethical obligation to comply
with mandatory reporting of disease or criminal conduct. 8
In contrast to those who deal primarily with the adult mem-
bers of the family, the physician's confidential relationship is with
the patient79 and the patient is the child."' It is for the welfare of
the abused child that the physician is obligated to use his profes-
that nothing he reveals will go forth. Once there is a suspicion among
patients that their confidences are not safe with a doctor the relation-
ships between them become seriously impaired and quite unsuited to
the proper practice of medicine.
77. See authorities cited note 74 supra; Dawson, The Doctor as a Citizen,
2 BRITISH IEDICAL J. 1474 (1954).
78. See A.M.A., PPiNcipir.s OF M2icA ETHIcs § 9 (1957). IDFIED-mM, op.
cit. supra note 74, at 59 says:
Where there is any question or suspicion of crime the tenets of
professional confidence will be stretched to the utmost. In some cases
they will have to be set aside. A practitioner is not bound to answer
questions put to him by the police nor is he bound to pass on infor-
mation of his own accord.... If the practitioner becomes aware that
a crime is contemplated by his patient he is entitled to take what steps
he can to prevent the crime,
though he suggests, id. at 60, that there may be a distinction between re-
porting of felonies and reporting a misdemeanor. KoNoLD, A HISTORY OF
AacARcr INIEDicA ETHics 1827-1912, at 45 (1962), refers to the refusal
of physicians in the District of Columbia during the nineteenth century to
certify the nature of a patient's disability for pension applications or to
report birth defects, congenital or hereditary diseases, or illegitimacy on
birth certifications, though subsequently the medical profession came to
acknowledge the importance of reporting certain diseases and hazards to
public welfare.
79. The testimonial privilege may not be limited to communications from
the patient alone. See D.C. CODE ANx. § 14.307(a) (Supp. IV 1965), referring
to information obtained from the patient, his family, or from the person or
persons in charge of him, and a number of statutes which refer only to
"information which [the physician] acquired in attending a patient in a
professional capacity." See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 1881(4); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 154-1-7 (1963); IDAno CODE ANN. § 9-203(4) (1963); MIcn.
Compiz. LAws § 600.2157 (1948); Mnv. STAT. § 595.02(4) (1961); N.Y.C.P.L.R.
4504(a); ORE. REV. STAT. § 44.040 (1963); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 328 (1958);
S.D. CODE § 36.0101 (1939); Wisc. STAT. § 325.21 (1961). Nevertheless, it
seems clear that the privilege is the patient's. See DE WrM, op. Cit. supra
note 75, at 129; McConmaicK § 105; 8 WiGmoRE § 2386.
80. Though the question is rarely litigated, it is clearly stated in In re
M- P- S-, 342 S.W.2d 277 (Mo. App. 1961), a child neglect case
in which the mother charged with physical abuse of the child had sought to
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sional skill, judgment, and discretion. Since the primary purpose
of the reporting statutes, expressly set out in the preamble or "pur-
pose" section in Minnesota and several states8' and implicit in
all, is the protection of the abused child, the disclosure by the
physician is consistent with and in furtherance of his obligation
to his patient.
The question of the propriety of requiring mandatory report-
ing by physicians appears, then, not so much one of the require-
prevent the physician who examined the child from testifying. The trial
court sustained the objection, but the appellate court found this to be error,
saying,
Dr. Thiele's patient in this case was the child, not the appellant. It
is undoubtedly true that under ordinary circumstances a parent, as
the natural guardian, would have the right to claim the privilege on
behalf of his child when it would -be to the best interests of the minor
to do so. But the circumstances here were far from ordinary. The child
was not a litigant, but the subject of the proceedings, the purpose of
which was to protect his interests and safeguard his welfare. In one
sense, appellant stood in an adversary position, and the objection was
made on her behalf and in the furtherance of her interests, not that of
her child. And, in view of the nature of the proceedings, it was clearly
not to his best interests to have excluded the doctor's testimony.
Id. at 283. State v. Tornquist, 254 Iowa 1135, 120 N.W.2d 483 (1968),
denied to defendant in a criminal prosecution for the death of the child the
right to assert the privilege as to communications made by himself to the
hospital personnel. Though the court in the latter case relied in part on the
fact that the child was dead on arrival and therefore no physician-patient
relation ever was established, and that the communication was not necessary
or of use in the doctor's efforts to revive the child, it also said, quoting from
an earlier case, State v. Grimmell, 116 Iowa 596, 600, 88 N.W. 342, 343
(1901),
"This, as will be observed, is a criminal case, and it surely will not do
to hold that a statute intended to protect a patient should operate as
a shield for one who is charged with murder...."
We agree with the holding in the Grimmell case that the statute
was not intended to be used as a shield for one accused of her murder
...we think it points to a desirable standard of application of the
privilege statute....
254 Iowa at 1153, 120 N.W.2d at 493-94. See also Vance v. State, 182 Miss.
840, 183 So. 280 (1938).
81. Mnrq. STAT. ANN. § 626.554, subd. 1 (Supp. 1965), added by Minn.
Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 759, § 2, subd. 1, quoted in text accompanying note 65
supra. See also, CoLo. REv. STAT. ANx. § 22-13-1 (1963); FL.A. STAT. §
828.041(1) (1963); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 16-1624 (Supp. 1963); Ind. Laws 1965,
ch. 268, § 1; Iowa Acts 1965, Senate File 50, § 1; Kans. Laws 1965, ch. 386,
§ 1; IKy. REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(1) (Supp. 1965); ME. R v. STAT. ANN.
ch. 22, § 3851, as added by Maine Laws 1965, ch. 68; N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:6-8.1
(Supp. 1964); OTuA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 845 (Supp. 1965), as added Okla.
Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 43, § 1; R.I. GN. LAws ANN. § 40-13.1-1 (Supp. 1961);
Utah Laws 1965, ch. 166, § 1; Wash. Laws 1965, ch. 13, § 1.
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ments of professional ethics, as of the wisdom of requiring one group
of persons to make reports of injuries while not imposing simi-
lar obligations on others. As has been noted, the physicians are by
the nature of their profession more likely to be aware of the exist-
ence of child abuse. Their ethical principles would appear to re-
quire a report which would result in greater protection for the
child-patient. Yet, at the same time, there may be apprehension
lest the possibility of such reports may deter parents from bring-
ing their children to medical practitioners for treatment. This is a
matter for serious concern, since the welfare of the abused child
may be as greatly imperiled by failure to seek adequate medical
care for existing injuries as by the potentiality of future injury.
California, at least, has apparently sensed this by qualifying the
obligation with the proviso: "The physician and surgeon shall not
be required to report as provided herein if in his opinion it would
not be consistent with the health, care or treatment of the
minor. 8 2 To what extent this proviso will be invoked by physi-
cians and to what extent the mandatory reporting elsewhere will
prove a deterrent to seeking medical care probably may never be
determined by any statistical studies.
2. Overcoming Factors Deterring Reporting
The mandatory reporting acts appear to be designed to over-
come the disinclination of physicians and hospital personnel tG
make reports of cases of possible child abuse, a disinclination
noted by a number of authors."' Some of the failure to report
undoubtedly arises from lack of recognition of child abuse by
individual physicians or uncertainty as to the "diagnosis" of
child abuse."' Another factor frequently mentioned is the psycho-
logical barrier to admission that such abuse is done by parents
or those entrusted with the care of the child."5 Even when the
physician does recognize the possibility of parental abuse there
may be reluctance to report such circumstances based on fear of
82. CAL. PEN. CODD § 11161.5.
88. See articles cited in note 51 supra.
84. See Bain, The Physically Abused Child, 81 PEDuTmcs 895, 896
(1963); Boardman, A Project To Rescue Children From Inflicted Injuries,
Social Work, Jan. 1962, p. 43; tenBensel & Raile, supra note 47, at 981.
85. See Bain, supra note 84, at 896; Boardman, supra note 84, p. 46;
Braun, Braun & Simonds, supra note 47, at 100; Elmer, Abused Young Chil-
dren Seen in Hospitals, Social Work, Oct. 1960, p. 98; Fontana, Donovan &
Wong, The "Maltreatment Syndrome" in Children, 269 NEw ENGLAND J.
nicnq 1389, 1392-93 (1963); Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller &
Silver, The Battered Child Syndrome, 181 A.M.AJ. 17 (1963).
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civil or criminal responsibility for erroneous reports8 6 Similarly,
reluctance to report may arise from a belief that the confidential
relationship between the physician and his patient requires that
the physician refrain from disclosures of "privileged communica-
tion" or confidential information. Finally, there may be reluc-
tance to become involved in the legal proceedings which would
follow reports to the police or welfare authorities.,8
The enactment of a reporting statute does not assure that
physicians will recognize cases of child abuse. However, the exist-
ence of the statute and the continuing publicity given in medical
journals to the problem of child abuse may well increase the recog-
nition by physicians and hospital personnel of the existence of
child abuse generally. By pointing to the problem and imposing
a duty on the physician to make reports, the statute may serve
to alert the physician to signs of abuse which might otherwise
be ignored or overlooked. Surely this is one of the objectives of
the acts already passed. How effective they are in giving rise to
recognition of otherwise undetected cases of abuse cannot be
determined in so short a time, and perhaps never.
It is even less clear to what extent the statutes or the publicity
given to them and the problem of child abuse will reduce the
psychological barriers to individual recognition of child abuse.
Certainly the creation of a formalized machinery for the identifi-
cation of child abuse and the provision of legal machinery for
dealing with the case of the abused child once identified may
help in preparing the individual physician to acknowledge the
potential existence of child abuse. It seems likely, however, that
intra-professional education may be a more important factor
in overcoming this barrier than statutory enactments.
Apprehensions as to potential liability, which might lead to
reluctance on the part of physicians or hospitals to report cases
of suspected child abuse, are probably exaggerated. Such potential
liability might be in the nature of civil or criminal responsibility
for defamation," civil liability for invasion of privacy by dis-
86. See Boardman, supra note 84, p. 46; Braun, Braun & Simonds, supra
note 47, at 100.
87. See Bain, supra note 84, at 896; tenBensel & Raile, supra note 47,
at 981.
88. See Bain, supra note 84, at 896; Boardman, supra note 84, p. 46; Braun,
Braun & Simonds, supra note 47, at 100; Fontana, Donovan & Wong, supra
note 85, at 1392; tenBensel & Raile, supra note 47, at 981.
89. "Defamation is ... that which tends to injure 'reputation' in the popu-
lar sense; to diminish the esteem, respect, goodwill and confidence in which
the plaintiff is held, or to excite adverse, derogatory or unpleasant feelings
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closing of "private facts" or by placing parents in a false light 90
or the possible civil liability for breach of confidence' Yet every
reported American case in which a physician has made disclosures
concerning patients for the protection of third parties has resulted
in recognition of a privilege on the part of the physician and a
denial of liability.92 There seems little doubt that where the
physician or hospital makes disclosures which are beneficial to
or opinions against him." PROSSER, TORTS § 106, at 756 (3d ed. 1964). Civil
defamation is generallly restricted to false statements, or, to put it another
way, all jurisdictions recognize that proof of truth published with good motive
is an absolute defense, though criminal defamation may include truthful pub-
lications made without justification. Id. § 111, at 824--25.
There may be some question as to whether an oral report of facts which is
likely to be reduced to writing by the legal authorities to whom reported
would constitute "slander" or "libel." See Peterson v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
65 Minn. 18, 67 N.W. 646 (1896), 72 Minn. 41, 74 N.W. 1022 (1898), 75 Aflnn.
368, 77 N.W. 985 (1899); Ostroe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 175 N.E. 505 (1981);
Valentine v. Gonzales, 190 App. Div. 490, 179 N.Y.S. 711 (1920). Undoubted-
ly, however, a report that a parent had abused his child would fall within the
category of defamation per se, actionable without proof of special damages
because of imputation of a crime of moral turpitude. See PRoSSER, TorTS
§ 107, at 773-74, 781-82 (3d ed. 1964).
90. See id. § 112, at 834-39, for a description of these aspects of invasion
of privacy.
91. The recognition of a separate tort for breach of confidence may not
be clear but is implicit in such cases as Boyd v. Wynn, 286 Ky. 173, 150
S.W.2d 648 (1941); Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N.W. 831 (1920);
Clark v. Geraci, 29 Misc. 2d 791, 208 N.Y.S2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Munzer v.
Blaisdell, 183 Mlise. 773, 49 N.Y.S.2d 915 (Sup. Ct. 1944), afd, 269 App. Div.
970, 58 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1945); Barry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 381 P.2d 814
(1958); Smith v. Driscoll, 94 Wash. 441, 162 Pac. 572 (1917); Furniss v.
Fitchett, [1958] N.Z.L.R. 396; cf. Hague v. Williams, 37 NJ. 828, 181 A.2d
345 (1962); Hammer v. Polsky, 36 Misc. 2d 482, 233 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct.
1962); Alexander v. Knight, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 649, 197 Pa. Super. 79, 177
A.2d 142 (1962); Quarles v. Sutherland, 389 S.W.2d 249 (Tenn. 1965).
92. See Simonsen v. Swenson, supra note 91 (disclosure of patient's com-
municable disease to owner of hotel in which he lived); Clark v. Geraci, supra
note 91, (disclosure of alcoholism to federal employer of patient in explanation
of absenteeism); Berry v. Moench, upra note 91. In Berry the court found
no liability for disclosure of patient's physical and mental deficiencies made to
family of fiance, though it said liability might be imposed for disclosure
made without good faith belief or without reasonable care in determining the
facts. See Note, Medical Practice and the Right to Privacy, 43 Mum. L.
Rn~v. 943 (1959), referring to earlier English and Scottish cases in which lia-
bility was imposed even though the doctor purported to be acting to protect
the "morals" of third parties. Boyd v. Wynn, supra note 91, and Smith v.
Driscoll, supra note 91, found no liability where the doctor made the disclosure
as a witness in litigation, apparently limiting the patient's claim to assertion
of a physician-patient testimonial privilege in these circumstances. Of. Iverson
v. Frandsen, 237 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1956), and Shoemaker v. Friedberg, 80 Cal.
App. !2d 911, 183 P.2d 318 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947), which denied liability for dis-
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the child patient or which may prevent future abuse of this child
or others, the courts will recognize at least a qualified privilege
which can be overcome only by a showing of malice or lack of
good faith belief in the facts reportedf 3
Even though the ultimate success of a defense of privilege may
be well assured, the existence of even a vague threat of liability
may act as a deterrent to some physicians." A statutory rejection
of liability may, therefore, be desirable, though certainly not a
complete solution to the problem of physicians' reluctance through
fear of liability.95 Clearly no statute will prevent the filing of a
groundless claim or avoid some form of litigation vindicating the
physician.
closures on grounds other than protection of third parties. In Munzer v.
Blaisdell, supra note 91, the court recognized a cause of action for disclosure
of confidential records in a mental institution, but relied on specific statutory
language making these records confidential and without any indication that
the disclosure was in fact one within the general area of privileged communi-
cation for the protection of others.
93. There may be some question as to whether reports to public authori-
ties concerning suspected criminal or tortious conduct is "absolutely privi-
leged." See 1 HU'ns & JAAms, TORTS § 5.22, at 424 (1956); PRossER, TORTS
§ 109, at 800 (3d ed. 1964). However, there is clearly a qualified privilege for
"informers." GATEy, LiBEL s SrL&Nam 210-16 (5th ed. 1960); 1 HARPER &
JAMES, TORTS § 5.26, at 448 (1956); PRossER, ToRTs § 110, at 811 (3d ed.
1964); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 598 (1988).
94. For example, even though there appear to be almost no reported
decisions holding a physician liable for malpractice in rendering first aid or
emergency medical treatment at the scene of an accident, a survey of a repre-
sentative sample of active physicians throughout the United States made by
the Legal Departnent of the American Medical Association in 1963 disclosed
that almost one-half answered yes to the question "Does fear of liability claims
make you unwilling to furnish emergency medical care away from your office
or hospital to strangers injured in accidents or stricken with sudden illness?"
See First Results: 196S Professional-Liability Survey, 189 A.M.A.J. 859, 864-
65 (1964). Of some 14,176 physicians answering this portion of the survey,
6,611 or 46.7% answered "Yes" and 7,556 or 53.3% answered "No." When
the answers were weighted in relation to the population of physicians in active
practice in the United States the ratio of "yes" to "no" answers was 50:50.
95. Within the past few years, some thirty-odd states have followed the
lead of California in 1959 in enacting "good samaritan statutes" which im-
munize physicians from civil liability for negligence in rendering first aid of
emergency medical treatment at the scene of an accident. See Note, Good
Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice, 64 CoLum. L. Rnv. 1301
(1964). Yet the survey mentioned in note 94 supra indicates that even in
states which have enacted such statutes, almost the same percentage of physi-
cians in 1963 were deterred from rendering emergency care by the apprehen-
sion of civil liability. See First Results: 1968 Professional-Liability Survey,
189 A.M.A.J. 859, 865 (1964). The breakdown of answers to the question
asked, weighted in terms of the population of actively practicing physicians
in the United States was as follows:
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The great majority of the mandatory reporting acts do specifi-
cally negate any civil liability on the part of the physician or
others participating in making the report, following the pattern
set by the Children's Bureau. The exceptions are California, Ore-
gon, Tennessee and Wisconsin." Though the Massachusetts act
(like the original Minnesota statute) refers only to liability for
defamation, it seems certain that the courts will interpret this as
covering the related claims for "invasion of privacy" or "breach
of confidence" to the extent these are recognized as independent
causes of action9 7 A somewhat slimmer majority of statutes, not
including California, Idaho, Maryland, Oregon, Tennessee, Wash-
ington and Wisconsin, exempt the reporting physician or institu-
tion from criminal liability as well, though again Massachusetts
refers to defamation. In view of the mandatory nature of the
obligation to make the report, even in the absence of an explicit
immunity granted by the statute, the courts should recognize at
least a qualified privilege to make the report in good faith. Simi-
larly, the mandatory nature of the report must be recognized as
making inapplicable the statutes of some 92 states (including
Minnesota) providing that betrayal of a professional secret con-
stitutes unprofessional conduct for which the physician's license
Excluding
Weighted Proportion "No" Answer
YES NO NoAns. YES NO
All states 48.5 48.4 3.1 50.0 50.0
States with good
samaritan laws 50.0 47.1 2.9 48.5 51.5
States without good
samaritan laws 50.5 46.1 3.4 52.3 47.7
States which had rejected
good samaritan laws 52.5 44.2 3.3 54.3 45.7
States in which good
samaritan laws had never
been introduced 45.4 51.0 3.6 47.1 52.9
Though the conclusion of the Law Department of the AMA is that the per-
centage differences are of no practical significance, one might conclude that in
terms of encouraging physician action it may be better not to raise the
question.
96. It is perhaps noteworthy that the Pennsylvania statute, which is in
most respects a close copy of California's, does make explicit reference to
the immunity of the doctor or institution making a report.
97. The courts appear to have recognized that the privileges applicable in
defamation actions are likewise defenses to invasion of privacy or breaches of
confidence. See cases cited in note 92 supra; 1 HARPER & J~xzs, TonTs § 9.7
(1956); PRossER, ToRTs § 93, at 64,-43 (3d ed. 1964).
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may be suspended or revoked."
Closely related to the question of liability is the issue of con-
fidentiality. As already developed above,99 there is no substantial
argument that the legal recognition of a physician-patient testi-
monial privilege or the professional ethics of the medical profes-
sion generally should preclude the physician from making a report
to the legal authorities of suspected child abuse. Even so, some
affirmative reassurance to the physician and to hospital personnel
may be desirable to overcome any individual scruples concerning
"informing."'10 0 Many of the mandatory reporting acts, including
Minnesota's recent revision, contain explicit negations of any
physician-patient privilege. The exceptions are those states in
which the privilege has never been recognized,1°1 and California
and Oregon in which there is recognition of the privilege.
The omission of any specific language of negation of the privi-
lege in California and Oregon may be explained in part by the fact
that those states permit assertion of the privilege only in civil
actions and not in criminal proceedings"m 2 coupled with a belief
that criminal prosecution was likely to be the result of the report.
Moreover, in California the bringing of a civil action for damages
or wrongful death constitutes a waiver of the privilege,103 and
it may have been thought that any action brought primarily on
behalf of the child would be treated in the same way, including
juvenile court proceedings. But perhaps the best explanation for
the omission in these states was the fact that even in a juvenile
court proceeding involving protection of the child or termination
98. See mN. STAT. § 147.02(4) (1961) and the entire list in STETLER &
Mommz, DocToR Prm Arm Tn LAw 27S, nn.4, 6 (4th ed. 1962), dis-
cussed at 269-70.
99. See notes 76, 78, 79 & 80 8upra and text accompanying notes 74-81
,tupra.
100. See Watson, Some Psychological Aspects of Teaching Professional
Responsibility, 16 J. LEGAL ED. 1, 8 (1963).
101. Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Rhode Island, Tennes-
see and Texas. Although the New York reporting statute makes no specific
reference to the privilege, the privilege statute itself, N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 4504(b),
specifically excludes from the scope of the statutory privilege "information in-
dicating that a patient who is under the age of sixteen years has been the vic-
tim of a crime."
102. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CoDn § 1881(4), People v. Lane, 101 Cal. 513, 36
Pac. 16 (1894); ORE. REv. STAT. § 44.040(1)(d) (1963), State v. Betts, 235 Ore.
127, 384 P.2d 198 (1963). The Pennsylvania statute, though patterned after
the California act, makes specific reference to the physician-patient privilege
not being available.
103. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1881(4).
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of parental rights it appeared unlikely that the privilege could
be asserted successfully by the charged parents.
Although there is some suggestion in Wigmore's treatise that a
special confidential privilege may arise from disclosures made to
governmental authorities,104 the cases in which such a privilege
has been recognized must be distinguished from that of the phy-
sician reporting a wound or injury. The doctor complying with a
mandatory reporting statute, or even volunteering information
in those states which lack the statutes, appears readily distin-
guishable from the "informer" who seeks to conceal his identity
and thereby protect himself from retaliation by the criminal ele-
ments on whom he has informed.10 5 Similarly, the physician mak-
ing a mandatory or voluntary report is not to be equated with the
citizen required to make possible adverse disclosure in his own tax
returns or in an accident report. Moreover, if the physician's
testimony were to be treated as privileged, a significant avenue
for information necessary to resolve the battered child problem
would be foreclosed. It is dubious whether a sufficiently strong
public interest in maintaining the physician's anonymity or in
motivating voluntary disclosures justifies recognition of a privi-
lege asserted by the physician himself and certainly none asserted
by the party against whom the information is to be used.10 The
revision of the Minnesota statute removing any question of a
privilege as to the testimony of the physician 07 is clearly justified
and desirable.
104. 8 WIGMORm § 2374 (informer's privilege), 2377 (communications to
government), 2385a (death certificates), though in the latter case Wigmore
and MeNaughton argue that the only justification must be the policy of a
preexisting physician-patient privilege. Id. at 790-91 n.14.
105. 8 WIGmORE § 2374 indicates that the privilege is limited to the
identity of the informer and not to the contents of the information, since the
latter "are intended to be used and published in the course of prosecution."
Id. at 766. In any event the court may compel disclosure "in order to avoid
the risk of false testimony [and] . . . to secure useful testimony." Id. at 768.
Also the privilege would be inapplicable where the identity of the informer
were in fact known. Id. at 766.
106. See the statement of Professor David Louisell in another context:
"Even in jurisdictions where the [physician-patient] privilege is generally
acknowledged, it gives way to various statutory exceptions. E.g., MnqN. STAT.
§ 626.52 (1953) (obligation on physician to report bullet wounds treated by
him) . . . ." Louisell, supra note 72, at 740 n.28. See People v. Lay, 254 App.
Div. 372, 5 N.Y.S.2d 325 (1938), rejecting the physician-patient privilege in
New York where the physician was required to make a report of a bullet wound.
107. As noted in text note 62 upra, the original Minnesota requirement
of reports of child abuse was made in an amendment to the existing statute
dealing with gunshot wounds, Minn. Sess. Law 1963, ch. 489, § 1 (Mswn. STAT.
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The mandatory character of the reporting acts may have the
effect of removing some of the psychological barriers to acting as
an "informer" though the difficulty of establishing failure to com-
ply and the absence in some statutes of any penalty for non-
compliance'"8 may raise questions as to how efficacious the "man-
datory" feature is. The author has been led to believe that some-
what similar requirements for the reporting of venereal disease
have been ignored or circumvented by a "diagnosis" of another
condition. But the child abuse cases may present a distinguishable
situation inasmuch as the failure to make a report and to initiate
some legal machinery may permit further abuse or injury to the
child. Certainly the members of the medical profession who have
been most concerned with the problems of child abuse have not
foreseen any substantial attempt at avoidance of mandatory
reporting.
The final factor which may deter reporting, reluctance to be-
come involved in litigation, is an understandable one. However
understandable, it is not sufficient to justify nonreporting. Here
the mandatory character of the acts, coupled with the express
recognition that the reporting physician will be expected to
become involved in litigation'0 9 may serve to overcome some of
the hesitancy of physicians by manifesting a community decision
that involvement is necessary to help resolve the problem of the
battered child.
ANN. § 626.52 (Supp. 1964)), and might therefore be read in conjunction with
the following section, § 626.53, see text accompanying note 68 supra, which
seemed to require that the report and reporter be kept confidential and that
the reporter was protected from any required testimony. There has been no
adjudication of this latter section and it may only have been intended to pre-
serve a preexisting physician-patient privilege, which would not present any
bar to testimony in the case of child abuse. However, it may also have been
intended or might be interpreted as creating a specific privilege which could be
asserted by the physician himself. The 1965 act which appears to sever the
child abuse report from the provisions for gunshot wounds and which is ex-
plicit in referring to testimony in judicial proceedings and in negating the
physician-patient privilege, avoids these difficulties.
108. See, e.g., the Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island and Wisconsin statutes
cited in notes 55 and 67 supra, which impose no sanction, and the California,
North Carolina, Texas and Washington statutes cited in notes 55 and 67
supra, making the report discretionary.
109. Those statutes which specifically negate the physician-patient privi-
lege clearly anticipate the physician's appearance in litigation. The statutes
of Minnesota and a number of other states provide immunity to anyone par-
ticipating in the making of the reports or anyone participating in a judicial
proceeding resulting from such reports. See Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
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C. SoAE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE REPORTING STATUTES
Notwithstanding the obvious desirability of encouraging iden-
tification and reports to legal authorities of cases of child abuse,
one may question the precise form of the reporting statutes as
recommended by the Children's Bureau and as enacted in a num-
ber of the states.
1. Definition of Reportable Injuries
There is no real uniformity as to the character of the injury
which must be reported. The model act and twelve of the state
statutes refer to injuries "inflicted upon ... [the child] other than
by accidental means,"110 while three statutes refer to injuries "not
explained by the available medical history as being accidental in
nature.""' Three statutes speak of injuries intentionally caused
or inflicted" 2 or "caused by blows, beatings, physical violence
or abuse where there is some cause to believe that such physical
injury was intentionally or wantonly inflicted."" 3 Three other
states define the reportable injuries in terms of violations of their
criminal codes." 4 A substantial group qualify the reportable in-
juries in terms of parental abuse."- Tennessee speaks of a wound
or injury which "appears to be unusual or of such nature, so as to
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michi-
gan, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington and
Wyoming statutes cited in note 55 supra.
110. Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington and
Wyoming statutes, cited in note 55 supra.
111. Arizona and Ohio statutes, cited in note 55 supra.
112. Michigan and Wisconsin statutes, cited in note 55 supra.
113. ORE. Rnv. STAT. § 146.710(2) (Supp. 1963).
114. California, Maryland and Pennsylvania statutes, cited in note 55
supra. Though the California penal provision begins by reference to "willfully
causes or permits any child to suffer," it also includes any person "who inflicts
thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, and [who] ... causes
or permits the life or limb of such child to be endangered." CAL. PEN. CODE §
273a. The Maryland penal section speaks of "maliciously beats, strikes or
otherwise mistreats such minor child to such degree as to require medical
treatment." MID. AN . CODE tit. 27, § 1A (Supp. 1964). The Pennsylvania
penal sections to violation of which reference is made are not specified and
would apparently include "assault and battery" which requires some form of
intent, PA. STAT. ANw. tit. 18, § 4708 (1963), as well as "cruelty to minors,"
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4728 (1963), which specifically declares criminal "who-
soever cruelly ill-treats, abuses or inflicts unnecessarily cruel punishment upon
any minor child . .. ."
115. The statutes differ somewhat: Kansas, New York, North Carolina
and Oklahoma refer to injuries "inflicted . . . as a result of abuse or neglect,"
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indicate, or to have been caused by child brutality, child abuse, or
indication or suspicion of child brutality, or child abuse .... ",,h1
Minnesota, though referring in its "purpose" provision to "physi-
cal injury inflicted... by other than accidental means," requires a
report of "all cases of physical injury to children . . . where the
injury appears to have been caused as a result of physical abuse
or neglect."' 11 All of these descriptions require the physician to
make some determination as to the existence of a human assailant
and in some instances as to his state of mind." 8
The model act and 12 of the state statutes further limit the
scope of reportable injuries in terms of the identity of the assail-
ant, usually the parent, guardian, or custodian of the child." 9
Kan. Laws 1965, ch. 386, § 2; N.Y. PEN. LAw § 483-d (Supp. 1964); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-318.2 (Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846 (Supp. 1965);
Idaho refers to "all cases of physical injury to children where the injury ap-
pears to have been caused as a result of physical abuse," TAHao CoDE ANN.
§ 16-1641 (Supp. 1965); Iowa refers to "physical injury inflicted . .. as a re-
sult of abuse or wilful neglect," Iowa Leg. Serv., Senate File 50, § 3 at 210
(1965); Massachusetts refers to "serious physical injury or abuse," A.ss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 39A (1965); Texas refers to "injury . . . other than
accidental and . . . due to maltreatment or neglect," TEx. REv. Cry. STAT.
ANN. art. 695c-1, § 1 (Supp. 1965); Utah speaks of physical injuries "as a
result of unusual or unreasonable physical abuse or neglect," Utah Laws 1965,
ch. 166, § 2; Washington adds to its initial definition of the injuries in terms of
other than accidental, "or who is found to be suffering from physical neglect or
sexual abuse," Wash. Laws 1965, ch. 13, § s.
Though some of these statutes do not refer specifically to the identity of
the assailant in the description of the obligation of the physician or others to
report, two do refer in their preambles to children "who ... may be further
threatened by the conduct of those responsible for their care and protection."
Kan. Laws 1965, ch. 386, § 1. See OKnA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 845 (Supp. 1965).
116. TENN. CoDE ANN. § 38-601 (Supp. 1964). Tennessee has no definition
of "child brutality" or "child abuse" and no specific statutory offense for
"child beating," though assault upon one's wife is a misdemeanor, TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-602 (1955), and willful exposure of a child to inclement weather with
intent to cause injury or leaving a child locked or fastened in a house or room
so as to prevent his escape in the event of fire or calamity are declared to be
criminal, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-1001 (1955).
117. MwmN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554, subd. 1, 2 (Supp. 1965).
118. The terms "other than by accidental means" or "not explained.., as
being accidental" may refer only to inadvertent or negligent conduct, but
may also be interpreted as referring to conscious and deliberate acts. The
references to "brutality" and "abuse" in the Tennessee statute, and to "physi-
cal abuse" in Idaho and Massachusetts, "abuse" in Iowa, and to "abuse or
neglect" in Kansas, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma and
Washington, raise similar questions as to whether the conduct must be deliber-
ate or merely inadvertent but unjustified.
119. Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts and South Dakota refer
to parent or other person responsible for his care; Colorado, Idaho and Wash-
ington to parent, stepparent, legal guardian or any other person having custody
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Though the revised Minnesota act does not specifically limit
reportable injuries in this fashion, the content of the report in-
cludes the identity of the parent or other person responsible for
the child's care and the references to "abuse or neglect"',2 ° implies
that only injuries at their hands are expected to be reported.
In terms of the basis for the physician-reporter's conclusions,
a large number of the statutes refer to him "having reasonable
cause to suspect ' 12 or "cause to believe' 1 22 that the defined types
of injuries have occurred. A few refer to an examination which
"discloses evidence of"' 23 reportable injuries or that "it appears
to the physician.., from observation of the minor"' 24 that abuse
has occurred. Other statutes, including Minnesota's, refer to in-
juries which "appear to have been caused" by abuse 2 ' or to "cir-
cumstances which indicate" violation of the child abuse statutes.''
Only a relative few refer to the existence of the injuries without
regard to cause to believe, reasonable cause or appearance of
child abuse.127
The physician is undoubtedly a skilled observer of physical
phenomena and is well equipped to determine whether the physi-
cal manifestations which he discovers square with the medical
history given by the parents or the description of the events lead-
ing up to the present condition of the child. The physician may be
trained by his education or experience to achieve psychological
of such child; Florida, Maine and Wyoming to "parent or caretaker"; Mary-
land to "any parent, adoptive parent or other person who has the permanent
or temporary care or custody of a minor child"; Michigan to "any person re-
sponsible for his care"; New Jersey to "parent, parents, guardian or person
having custody and control of the child"; North Carolina to persons "in loco
parentis" as well as the other terms; Rhode Island to "parent, stepparent, legal
guardian, or other person having custody or care of such child."
120. MmN. STAT. ANN. § 626.554, subd. 2 (Supp. 1965).
121. The model act's use of "reasonable cause to suspect," is repeated in
Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey and South Dakota; Illinois, Maine, Massa-
chusetts and North Dakota substitute "believe" for "suspect"; Iowa, Kansas,
New York and Oklahoma refer to "having reason to believe," and Wisconsin
to "an examination [that] ... creates a reasonable ground for an opinion of
the physician."
122. Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Utah,
Washington and Wyoming, cited in note 55 supra. Texas speaks of "if he
believes."
123. Arizona and Ohio, cited in note 55 supra.
124. CAL. PEN. CODE § 11161.5. See also Indiana's reference to "determine
by diagnosis and findings," Ind. Laws 1965, ch. 268, § 2.
125. TDHao CODE ANN. § 16-1641 (Supp. 1963); see TENN. CODE ANN. § 38-
601 (Supp. 1963).
126. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(b) (Supp. 1964).
127. Michigan and Pennsylvania, cited in note 55 supra.
BATTERED CHILD
insight into the motivations and drives of patients. But a lawyer
may legitimately question whether the licensed physician is
trained to differentiate between "accidental" and "intentional"
or "wanton" or "criminal" injuries, or whether he is equipped
by his experience to determine whether those injuries were in-
flicted by a parent or others responsible for the child's care rather
than by some irresponsible sibling or some other third person.
"Multiple lacerated wounds due to blows by a blunt instrument"
seems a permissible medical opinion. "A blow wilfully or non-
accidentally struck by A.B." is not, in this author's view, a per-
missible medical opinion.
Treatises on "forensic medicine" or "legal medicine" designed
to assist the physician in augmenting his medical skills with cer-
tain forensic knowledge do not appear to give much guidance
toward the latter type of conclusion. -'28 Examination of medical
literature generally may even suggest some question as to the iden-
128. See, e.g., GLIs~tR , DMICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND TOXICOLOGY 218-19
(11th ed. 1962). Chapter IX, dealing with the medical-legal aspects of wounds,
contains a discussion of "wounds in relation to culpability" which does not
indicate that medical evidence established either the culpability of the wounder
or his identity, though other materials in the same chapter suggest that medi-
cal expertise might be used to establish the physical character of the wounds
and the probable nature of the instrumentality inflicting them. Also, C~xxs &
PURCHASE, PRACTICAA FORENSIC MDICwINE (1957), especially the discussion of
wounds at 323-68. The materials at 340-42, 343-44 and 360-67, on "homi-
cidal, suicidal and accidental stab wounds" might lend some weight to the
claim that medical expertise is useful in determining culpability, but the ex-
pertise seems to be largely in the area of defining the physical possibility and
probability of self-inflicted or accidental wounding. In referring to the examina-
tion of the scene of the wounding (which all of the authors emphasize should
be examined carefully for clues), the authors say: "The examination of the
scene is essentially a police investigation, and the practitioner should avoid
at all costs any tendency to assume such a role. His opinion should be limited
to the medical aspect, and he will be well advised to be guided by the officer
in charge, and especially avoid touching things." Id. at 362. GONZALES, VANCE,
HELPERN & U BERGER, LEGAL MEricnm 188-90 (2d ed. 1954), deals primarily
with the role of the medical examiner in death cases. They discuss homicidal
suicidal, or accidental deaths from blunt forces, noting that it is not always
possible to identify what is the cause of death. Though referring to the physi-
cian's obligation (under New York law) to report cases of suspected criminal
violence, id. at 206, 307, they do not seem to give any specific criteria or as-
sistance in determining when such a case exists, though the existence of multi-
ple wounds may be taken as one possible "key." See id. at 353. GiADwoHL,
LEGAL AMIcnE 245-47 (1954), deals with "accident, suicide or murder,"
including the investigation of the scene of the injury and consideration of
"defense wounds" on the victim, but the discussion sheds little light on the
medical expert's competence to identify the perpetrator or nonphysical as-
pects of the injury.
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tity of the "battered-child syndrome" or "maltreatment syn-
drome."'- 9 Neither appears in the established medical dictionaries
in their tables of syndromes;O neither is found in the Standard
Nomenclature of Diseases and Operations published by the Ameri-
can Medical Association,131 though these omissions may reflect
only the modernity of the terms.
Of more significance is a second edition of a text on Pediatric
Diagnosis published in 1962.132 In dealing with the subject of
fractures of the extremities generally, the authors say: "Caffey
and others have recently properly emphasized the relatively fre-
quent occurrence of skeletal trauma for which no history may
be obtained, especially initially. Such lesions may be the result
of physical abuse of the baby by a parent, baby-sitter or sib-
ling."' 3 In discussing the causes of limp, the same authors report:
Simple trauma is probably the most frequent cause of limp in
young children. Caffey, Silverman and others have emphasized the
bizarre roentgenographic findings which may appear after unreported
trauma to the long bones in children. Often a history of trauma is
elicited in these instances only by careful requestioning of the par-
ents. 3
4
But such references are scarcely an affirmative recognition of a
distinguishable medical phenomenon; and a later section dealing
with "health supervision" and accidental injuries, as well as acci-
dent prevention, states the following:
129. See Pfundt, The Problem of the Battered Child, 35 POSTGRADUATE
MrDIcnm 426 (1964).
130. Search was made of BLAKISTON, Nw GouLD UMIcAL DICTIONARY
(2d ed. 1956) which predates the use of these terms, but not the work of
such men as Caffey, Woolley, and Evans or Silverman in relating the existence
of certain roentgenographic manifestations of lesion with the possibility of
trauma. Search was also made of STEmAw, MEDICAL DIcTIONARY (Unabridged
Lawyers' ed. 1961), and DouA-D, I LusT -D r IEmIcAI DIcTIONARY (24th
ed. 1965).
131. AMA, STAxDARD NOMENCLATuRE OF DISEASES AND OPERATIoNs (5th
ed. 1961). PATTON, PEDiATRic INDEx (1958), listing the various complaints
which may be encountered among children, discloses no reference to child
abuse or maltreatment as a recognized medical condition, as distinct from the
physical manifestations such as fractures, contusions, lacerations, burns etc.,
though again the date of publication may make such references premature.
132. GnEEN & RxcnmoND, PEDIATRIc DIAGNosis (2d ed. 1962) [hereinafter
cited as PE rIAuc DiAGNosiS].
138. Id. at 129, citing Caffey, Some Traumatic Lesions in Growing Bones
Other Than Fractures and Dislocations: Clinical and Radiological Features,
S0 BRITISH J. RADIOLoGY 225 (1957).
134. PEDATRic DIAGNoSIS 136, citing Silverman, The Roentgen Manifes-
tations of Unrecognized Trauma in Infants, 69 AiupncAN J. ROENTGENOLOGY
413 (1953).
BATTERED CHILD
the physician can help reduce the incidence of accidents by interpreting
to the parents the hazards to which children may be exposed ...
Parents.. . have the responsibility to provide a secure environment for
the child. ....
When accidents occur repeatedly to the same child, the physician
should concern himself with the parental attitudes which permit such
repetitions....
In general, however, the problem is related to general unawareness
of hazards .... 185
Such a statement does not suggest a complete recognition of the
syndrome.
At the same time, one cannot afford to ignore the fact that
medical literature has been augmented rapidly with case histories
of battered children and that more and more physicians are under-
taking to identify the examples of this syndrome. The pattern
which emerges from these case histories is one of multiple in-
juries to soft tissues and skeletal structures, discrepancies between
the history of the child as given to the physician and the ob-
jective findings of injury, and repeated injuries of a type not
expected in a nonabused childhood. Where these elements coexist,
at least a suspicion of child abuse may be justified. Certainly this
may be sufficient basis on which to justify some further investiga-
tion of the family situation by welfare agencies or other agencies
of the state concerned with the protection of the child.
What may be doubted is whether the foregoing provides suffi-
cient basis for a conclusion by the physician that the child has
been the subject of any intentional or wanton misconduct of
parents or others, or is the victim of "physical abuse or neglect,"
in the language of the Minnesota statute. The reluctance or
inability of physicians to come to these conclusions may well lead
to inadequate reporting, and therefore, undermine the purpose
of the statutes themselves. In this regard the language of the Ari-
zona, North Dakota and Ohio statutes which refer only to injury
or physical neglect not explained by the available medical history
as being accidental may be closer to the desirable criteria, though
still subject to some question as to whether the doctor must make
an evaluation of the character of the conduct of others.
What appears to be even more doubtful is the possibility
under the statutes of two states that the physician in connection
with a law enforcement agency may remove a child from the
parents' control on the basis of the belief that the child has had
physical injuries inflicted upon him other than by accidental
means by a parent, stepparent, legal guardian or other person
135. PEniAinuc DIAGNOSIS 468.
1965]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
having custody of the child, and that such removal is necessary
to protect the child from continued abuse.130 While this type of
provision may be intended only to impose restraints upon the law
enforcement agents by requiring the concurrence of the reporting
physician, it represents, in the view of this author, a misappre-
hension of the expertise of the physician and a misapplication of
that expertise.
A more desirable provision covering the same problem appears
in the Illinois statute requiring the welfare agency to whom the
report is made to provide protective services to prevent further
abuse of the child and specifically providing that the welfare
agency may petition the court to seek removal of the child from
the custody of its parents "whenever it believes removal of the
child to be necessary ....137 Similarly the Iowa statute spells out
the power of the department of social welfare to report to the
juvenile court and to take all lawful action necessary to protect
the child.3 8 The North Dakota law provides that if immediate
action is necessary to protect the child, the person making the
report should make it to the juvenile commissioner or the states'
attorney "who shall take immediate and suitable action ....
Each of these latter provisions envisions some formalized proce-
dures in which the rights of parents as well as the welfare of the
child may be protected.
One final point on the nature of the injury. Though no con-
scious difterentiation may have been intended, the language of
"'serious physical injury," used in the model act and some of the
state statutes, 4 ' as contrasted with "physical injury" or "wound
or injury"141 may be undesirable. The early identification of the
136.
No child upon whom a report is made shall be removed from his par-
ents, stepparents, guardian or other persons having custody by a law
enforcement agency without consultation with the . . . [county de-
partment of welfare] unless, in the judgment of the reporting physician
and the law enforcement agency, immediate removal is considered
essential to protect the child from further injury or abuse.
CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-4(2) (1963) (Emphasis added.); see R.I. Gmq.
LAws ANN. tit. 40, § 14.13.1-5(9) (Supp. 1964).
137. ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 23, § 2047 (Supp. 1965).
138. Iowa Acts 1965, Senate File 50, § 5 at 210 (1965).
139. N.D. Laws 1965, ch. 397, § 1.
140. See Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, North Dakota, Oklahoma and South Dakota statutes cited in note 55
supra.
141. See Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Michi-
gan, Vinnesota, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah and
Wyoming refer to "physical injury"; Pennsylvania and Tennessee to "wound
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pattern of abuse may mean an early and effective breaking of that
pattern forever. The Children's Bureau may have had in mind
avoiding the invocation of a cumbersome machinery of reports
and investigation in the absence of substantial showing of abuse.
It may also have felt that superficial injuries were unlikely to be
brought to the attention of a physician or hospital. While it may
be true that no criminal charges, or perhaps no case in juvenile
court, could be based on minor injuries, if the physician is alerted
by early signs of repeated trauma to the child's body which are
inconsistent with the medical history, the case may be identified
as one of potential "battered child syndrome" and some prophy-
lactic measures may be taken before serious injury occurs.
2. To Whom Reports Are Made
There are suggestions that physicians are more reluctant to
make reports to the police or law enforcement officers than they
would be to report suspected cases of child abuse to welfare
agencies or child-protective societies. 42 The full extent of this
reluctance is not clear. Considering the scepticism with which
many physicians seem to view "the law" and the increasing em-
phasis upon prevention and rehabilitation of the family rather
than penal sanctions, 143 it may be substantial.
In view of such reluctance, it is unfortunate that the Chil-
dren's Bureau model act and those of a substantial number of
the states provide only for reports to police or similar law en-
forcement authorities. 44 Explanations for such limited reporting
may come from two factors. One is the need for further investiga-
tion in order to determine the source of the physical injuries dis-
covered by the physician, an investigation that law enforcement
agencies might be expected to make. The other is the desire to
or injury"; Arizona and Ohio to "evidence of injury or physical neglect"; Wis-
consin to "abused or injured minor."
142. See, e.g., tenBensel & Raile, The Battered Child Syndrome, 46 MxNN.
MEDICINE 977, 981 (1963).
143. Hoel, Editorial, 46 MINN. MTEDicmn 1001 (1963), suggesting the
misplaced emphasis upon the penal aspects of reporting to police authorities
rather than to a child welfare agency; Dis FRANcIs, REVIEW OF LEGISLATION
To PROTECT THE BATTERED Cm 8 (1964).
144. Arizona, Colorado, Louisiana, Maryland and Ohio refer to peace
officers or police authorities; New Jersey requires a report to the county
prosecutor; Tennessee to the police, sheriff or district attorney; Washington to
police, prosecuting attorney or the sheriff; Wisconsin to the district attorneyr or
sheriff. Oregon requires the report to be made to the coroner or medical in-
vestigator for the county, who is required to report his conclusion that a crime
may have been committed to the district attorney.
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have some uniformity throughout the state or nation and the
universal presence of some law enforcement agency to whom a
report may be made at any time. 45 Yet, of the states which
require reports to law enforcement agencies alone, only four have
made specific provision for investigation or have described the
obligations of the law enforcement officials to whom the report
is made. In Colorado the law enforcement agency is to refer the
report to the county department of welfare, which in turn makes
the investigation and determines the circumstances surrounding
the injury and what further steps should be taken for the protec-
tion of the child. 45 At the same time, as noted earlier, the law
enforcement officials in combination with the reporting physician
may cause the child to be temporarily removed from the control
of the parents to prevent further injury. 41 In New Jersey, the
county prosecutor to whom the original report is made conducts
an investigation and has discretion to proceed with criminal prose-
cution or to file a complaint with the Bureau of Children's Services
or any other public or private agency providing protective serv-
ices for children. 48 As a consequence both of these states have
recognized the role of the welfare services as a primary one in
the resolution of the child abuse problem. Oregon, which provides
for reports to the county coroner or medical investigator, also
provides for investigation by that official. Whenever he finds that
the injury was to a child of 12 or under and "was caused in a
manner which could place the child under the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court," he is to report the circumstances to that court.4
Washington makes it the duty of the law enforcement agency to
whom the report is made to investigate and refer the report to the
juvenile department of the superior court.'5
California, which originally provided only for reports to police
authorities, amended its statute in 1963 to provide for alternative
reports to the nearest child welfare agency offering child protective
services.' 5 ' Nineteen other states originally provided for reports
either to the welfare agency alone' 52 or to the welfare agency as
145. See THE ABUsED Cnivn 8-9; Children's Bureau, U.S. Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, Report of Meeting on Physical Abuse of
Infants and Young Children, Jan. 15, 1962, at 3, 6.
146. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-13-4(1), -5 (1963).
147. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-13-4(2) (1963), quoted and discussed in
note 136 supra and accompanying text.
148. N.J. STAT. AhN. § 9:6-8.5 (Supp. 1964).
149. ORE. Rnv. STAT. §§ 146.730, 740(2) (Supp. 1963).
150. Wash. Laws 1965, ch. 13, § 5.
151. CAL. PEN. CoDE § 11161.5.
152. See Idaho, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina, Rhode
Island and Wyoming statutes cited in note 55 supra.
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well as law enforcement agencies 5' or to the court having jurisdic-
tion over juveniles and neglected children. 54 Several of these
statutes make specific reference to further investigation by the
welfare agencies. 15 The Idaho reporting provision is a part of a
comprehensive act dealing with the protection of children through
state and county departments of public assistance.""" Three of
the states direct the welfare agency to conduct an investigation
153. The Illinois statute provides that a report may be made to the law
enforcement agency as well as to the welfare agency, IIL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, §
2043 (Supp. 1965). The Indiana statute provides for a report either to the
Department of Welfare or to law enforcement officers, Ind. Laws 1965, ch. 268,
§ 3. The Iowa statute provides that the primary report is to be made to the
county dppartment of social welfare but that if there is reason to believe that
immediate protection for the child is necessary, there may be an oral report
to the law enforcement agency, Iowa Acts 1965, Senate File 50, § 4 at 209
(1965). In Kentucky, a copy of the written report sent to the police authorities
is to be forwarded to the Department of Child Welfare for investigation, Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.335(3) (Supp. 1965). Maine provides for reports to both
the department of health and welfare, division of child welfare, and to the
county attorney, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 3852 (Supp. 1965). In Michi-
gan the report is to be made in triplicate, one copy going to the prosecuting
attorney, one to the department of social welfare of the county in which the
physician believes the injury to have been inflicted, and the third copy to the
state department of social welfare, MICH. STAT. ANx. § 14.564(2) (Supp. 1964).
North Dakota, like Iowa, provides for a special report to the juvenile com-
missioner or the state's attorney, if the circumstances warrant immediate
action to protect the child, but makes the mandatory report go to the division
of child welfare, N.D. Laws 1965, ch. 327, § 1. Oklahoma provides for a report
either to a public child protective agency, a public welfare agency with re-
sponsibility for enforcing laws related to child welfare or protection, the
sheriff, the county attorney or the police. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 846
(Supp. 1965). In Pennsylvania, the report is to be made initially to the pre-
siding judge of the juvenile court or to the community child protective
service, where such court or service exists, and in their absence to the police
authorities. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4330(b) (Supp. 1964). Texas provides that
the report may be made to the judge of the juvenile court, the district attor-
ney, county attorney, local law enforcement agency or the probation officer of
the county. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 695c-1, § 1 (Supp. 1965). Utah pro-
vides that the report shall be made to the local police, the county sheriff or the
office of the state welfare department, Utah Laws 1965, ch. 166, § 3.
154. Florida provides for reports directly to the juvenile court judge. FLA.
STAT. § 828.041(2) (1963); Kansas also requires the report to be made to the
juvenile court, Kan. Laws 1965, ch. 386, § 2; South Dakota provides for re-
ports to the county court, which has jurisdiction over the children, S.D. Laws
1964, ch. 90, § 2. The statutes of Pennsylvania and Texas referred to in note
153 upra provide for reports to the juvenile court authorities in the alterna-
tive.
155. See Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Rhode Island, Washington and Wyoming statutes, note 55 supra.
156. IDAHO ACODE ANN. §§ 16-1624 to 16-1643 (Supp. 1965).
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and then to make a report to the court or district attorney.117
Others are more explicit in requiring that the welfare agencies pro-
vide protective services. Illinois provides that the Department of
Children and Family Services shall offer "protective social services
to prevent further abuses to the child, to safeguard his welfare,
and to preserve and stabilize family life wherever possible" and
that in performing these functions the department may make use
of the protective services of voluntary social agencies and may
petition the appropriate court for removal of the child from the
custody of the parent or other adult with whom he is living.'r,
Iowa provides for a thorough investigation, including inquiry into
the home environment and a visit to the child's home, assisted
by court orders to authorize the investigators to enter and ex-
amine the home.'59 A report is to be made to the juvenile court
and the county attorney as well as the law enforcement officials,
all of whom are directed to assist and cooperate in the investiga-
tion and to "take any other lawful action which may be neces-
sary or advisable for the protection of the child."'' 0 Massachusetts
has provided that if the department of public welfare finds that
a parent or person responsible for the care of the child inflicted
the injury or abuse, it shall take action necessary to prevent fur-
ther abuse or injury, including a provision that if the parent or
custodian cannot or will not make proper provisions for the care
and protection of the child, the department shall take action "in
accordance with law, as may be necessary for the care and pro-
tection of the child" including reference of the case to the district
attorney.'" North Carolina provides that after investigation to
determine the cause of the abuse, the county welfare directors
shall take such action "in accordance with law" as is necessary
to prevent the child from being subjected to further abuse or
neglect.' 62 North Dakota, after directing that the division of child
welfare shall make further investigation, requires a report in
writing to the juvenile court judge and provides that the state
division and the county welfare board shall provide protective
services not only for the injured child but other siblings "as may
be necessary for their well-being and shall offer such other social
157. See Ind. Laws 1965, ch. 268, § 4 ("if the facts so warrant" the Wel-
fare Department is to submit a report in writing to the prosecutor); Wash.
Laws 1965, ch. 13, § 5 and Wyo. STAT. Alw. § 14-28.3 (Supp. 1963) (making
the report to the court and county attorney mandatory).
158. ILL. Aziw. STAT. ch. 23, § 2047 (Supp. 1965).
159. Iowa Laws 1965, Senate File 50, § 5 at 210 (1965).
160. Ibid.
161. MAss. GEN. LAws, ch. 119, § 39B {Supp. 1964).
162. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.3 (Supp. 1965).
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services, as the circumstances warrant, to the parents or other
persons serving in loco parentis with respect to such child or
siblings."'1 3 Rhode Island, with a statute much like that of Colo-
rado, provides for an initial report and investigation by the divi-
sion of community services of the department of social welfare,
which is to advise the law enforcement agency of its investigation
and at the same time to provide social services or other services
necessary to protect the child and preserve the family. 64 The
law enforcement agency is to make its own investigation and
take such action as it deems appropriate, including possible re-
moval of the child from the family to prevent further abuse. 65
While in most cases this latter power is limited by requiring
consultation with the department of social welfare, in case the
law enforcement agency and the reporting physician concur in
the belief that immediate removal is essential to protect the
child, no such consultation is required. As already indicated,
this author has serious doubts as to the wisdom of such a provi-
sion, involving as it does no protection of judicial proceedings sub-
ject to rules of evidence and burden of proof and the protection
of adversary procedures with counsel, and turning upon the con-
clusions of a physician based on medical findings.
The Minnesota statute, which like California originally pro-
vided for reports to the police authorities, was recently amended
to require the report to be made to the appropriate police author-
ity and to the county welfare agency. 66 The welfare agency is
then directed to make an investigation of complaints of neglect
and abuse of children and to offer protective social services in an
effort to protect the health and welfare of the children and to pre-
vent further abuse.167 The precise role of the police authorities in
dealing with the abused child problem is not spelled out in the
statute. It may be believed that they can provide additional in-
vestigation and will be more readily available to deal with emer-
gency cases than might the county welfare agencies in nonurban
communities. Since there is no specific reference in the reporting
statute to the possibility of removal of the child from parental
control, this aspect of the protective services is discussed later
in this article. For the moment it seems sufficient to note that
the Minnesota law, and that of a majority of the states having
mandatory reports, appears to be consistent with the medical
163. N.D. Laws 1965, ch. 327, §§ 2, 3.
164. R.I. GEN. LAws § 40-13.1-4 (Supp. 1964).
165. R.I. GEN. LAws § 40-13.1-5 (Supp. 1964).
166. MnmT. STAT. ANN. § 626.554, subd. 3 (Supp. 1965).
167. Id. at subd. 4.
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viewpoint emphasizing rehabilitation and prevention rather than
the penal aspects of the law.
3. Nature of the Report
A substantial majority of the statutes, including Minnesota's
and others based on the Children's Bureau model, are explicit in
regard to the necessity for both an immediate oral report and a
more comprehensive written report to the proper authorities.0 8
The combination of oral and written reports is desirable in view
of the possible necessity for immediate action to protect the
welfare of the child and the need for a formal record of the report
made by the physician. Statutes which do not provide for both
forms of report may fail to achieve these dual objectives.
Those statutes which are modeled on the Children's Bureau
proposal, such as Minnesota's, detail the information to be given
in the report including the name and address of the child and his
parent or other persons responsible for his care, the child's age,
the nature and extent of his injuries and evidence of prior injuries,
and any other information believed to be helpful in establishing
the cause of injuries and the identity of the perpetrator.' 0 Two of
the states do not specify information relating to the identity of
the perpetrator, but require the other elements.' 7 Two require
"a description of his injuries" but are not explicit as to the evidence
of prior injury, and while speaking of information as to the "cause
of injuries and the manner in which they were inflicted" are not
explicit as to information regarding the identity of the perpe-
trator. 17' Three statutes specify a report of the name of the child
and his whereabouts and the character and extent of injuries, but
do not require the physician to report the name of the parents
or others, nor information as to the cause of injury. 72 Wisconsin
requires a report of the fact of injury and the physician's opinion
168. Only the statutes of Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts, New York,
North Carolina, Oregon, Tennessee and Wisconsin are silent on the question
whether the report is to be in writing. Florida, Louisiana and Maine refer only
to written reports; while Michigan speaks of an "immediate" report which is
to be made in triplicate, obviously requiring that it is to be written.
169. See Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Washington and Wyoming statutes,
cited note 55 supra.
170. Arizona and Ohio statutes, cited note 55 supra.
171. Michigan and Texas statutes, cited note 55 supra.
172. California, Pennsylvania and Tennessee statutes, cited note 55 supra.
Tennessee adds the place of injury as well.
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that the condition was intentionally caused by another as well as
the facts and circumstances leading to the formation of that
opinion.173 Maryland specifies that the report shall be of "all cir-
cumstances surrounding [the] treatment" of a child under circum-
stances which indicate violation of the statute making child abuse
a felony. 74 By contrast, the statutes in Idaho,175 Massachu-
setts,176 New York,177 and Oregon' are relatively general in re-
quiring only a report of "all cases of injury," "such injury or
abuse," "the matter," or "any injury," though the qualifications
already noted on the type of injury which is to be reported in
these states suggest that the report might contain reference to
those factors which indicate that the injuries apparently arose
from "physical abuse by a parent ... " "serious physical injury or
abuse inflicted by a parent . . . ," "abuse or neglect," or "blows,
beatings, physical violence or abuse where there is some cause to
believe that such physical injury was intentionally or wantonly
inflicted."
No matter what use is ultimately made of the facts reported,
it is desirable that any report contain as much information rele-
vant to the identification and ultimate resolution of an instance
of suspected "battered child syndrome" as is feasible. If the
physician or another making the report has information which
indicates the probable cause of injury to the child or the identity
of the perpetrator, he should report this. Yet, in view of the limi-
tations on the ability of the physician to acquire such information
in all cases, there should be no requirement that he delay his
report until he has made an investigation beyond that necessary
to develop the medical facts: the existence of injury, evidence of
prior injuries, inconsistency of injuries with the purported medi-
cal history, or other factors which indicate the probability or pos-
sibility of "battered-child syndrome." In this regard, the Chil-
dren's Bureau proposal might make it clearer that the immediate
report of suspicious facts need not be as complete as the written
report and that in any event it is only the identity of the child
and the medical facts which are required of the physician. At
the same time, all state statutes would more fully accomplish the
purpose of protection of the child by encouraging as full a report
of relevant information as the physician can make.
173. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 325.21(2) (Supp. 1965).
174. AI. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 11A(b) (Supp. 1964).
175. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1641 (Supp. 1963).
176. M Ass. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 119, § 39A (Supp. 1964).
177. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 483-d.
178. ORE. Rav. STAT. § 146.720 (Supp. 1963).
1965]
58 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:1
The questions just raised as to the details of the mandatory
reporting statutes should not be taken as criticism of their primary
thrust. The attempts to formulate programs of identification are
indeed admirable. The variety of formulations has served to sug-
gest a number of desirable provisions which might be included in
any future legislation. The experience in Minnesota, with its
early attempt to provide for identification and its subsequent
revision of the statute to incorporate provisions which had found
wider acceptance, deserves special commendation, as does the pio-
neering effort in California. These experiences indicate an alert-
ness on the part of public officials and legislators to the need for
continuing work in this area. The same conscientious attitude also
must prevail in continuing attention to the further problems of
prevention and protection of the child once the identification
process has functioned.
